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Abstract
In this paper, we present an alternative method of gathering seed data for random number generation (RNG) in
cryptographic applications. Our proposed method utilises the inherent randomness of signal data from celestial
sources in radio astronomy to provide seeds for RNG. The data sets were collected from two separate celestial
sources, and run through the SHA-256 algorithm to deskew the data and produce random numbers with a
uniform distribution. The resulting data sets pass all tests in the NIST Statistical Test Suite for random data, with
a mean of 98.9% of the 512 total bitstreams from the two sources passing all tests in the NIST suite, as well as
further testing in R. These results are on par with the control set generated using Java’s SecureRandom
function. An explanation of the sources, the data processing and detailed results of each of the tests are
presented.
Keywords
Random number generation, RNG, random noise, NIST, seeds, cryptographic hash functions, SHA-256, secure
hashing algorithm, radio astronomy, signal noise, data analysis, astronomy, analytics, random sequences

INTRODUCTION
The use of random number generators is a fundamental element of cryptographic systems. The creation of
random initialisation vectors and keys are of utmost importance in security applications which utilise encryption
on a day-to-day basis globally. The means by which these numbers are generated varies from application to
application, however many are created through algorithmic processes, such as the Monte Carlo methods (Gentle,
2006). Many different options for producing truly random numbers through nature have been proposed, utilising
the signal noise of lasers (Applegate et al., 2015), or implementing quantum chaotic generators (Akhshani,
Akhavan, Mobaraki, Lim, & Hassan, 2014). In this paper we propose an alternative method for seeding RNGs
which utilises the inherent randomness of the signal noise produced by radio telescopes, with a scheme which
implements the Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) as a deskewing algorithm for randomness extraction. The
output of this scheme passes statistical tests for randomness in both R and the NIST Statistical Test Suite (NIST
STS), and offers a new method of collecting random numbers for use in seeding cryptographic applications. This
research offers applications in the implementation of secure random number generators such as SHA-256 (Dang,
2015), which rely on irreproducible, statistically random seed data for security. The proposed scheme for
gathering seed data could be utilised in the application of cryptographic protocols for secure systems, as our
results show it presents a high-level of performance paired with rapid data collection.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in Part I relevant prior research is discussed briefly, and an overview of
the area is given. In Part II the operation and theory of radio telescopes and the related signal noise is explained.
Part III then offers our data sources and method for the collection of the output. Part IV enumerates the method
by which the gathered data was processed using SHA-256 for deskewing purposes and our results based on the
outcome of the statistical testing completed. Finally, Part V offers our conclusions and suggestions for further
research.

RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION AND RANDOM SEEDS
The generation of random numbers for security applications is an ever-present concern. Utilising hardware to
generate these numbers is a well-developed area, in which the main aim is to mitigate the statistical properties of
the data, and to determine whether there is any way for an adversary to estimate the likely output of a particular
system. As the algorithms used in these applications are themselves public knowledge, the security rests in the
seed, for deterministic systems, and in the data source, for non-deterministic RNG.
Schemes such as the secure RNG developed by Lo Re, Milazzo, & Ortolani (2014) make use of the inherent
properties of hardware components to collect data. In the system proposed by Lo Re et al. (2014) each node of
the wireless sensor network is capable of generating random numbers, which are provided to the leader node.
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Other systems have utilised the properties of quantum mechanics to implement RNGs. Lunghi et al. (2015)
offered a quantum RNG which maintained consistent monitoring of the output to ensure continuing statistical
randomness. Cicek, Pusan, & Dundar (2014) presented a method for True Random Number Generation (TRNG)
through a chaos system, which gave excellent performance when tested by the NIST Statistical Test Suite, with
the bitstream resulting from the scheme split into 1 Mbit blocks.
In generating random numbers for everyday use in cryptographic applications, most systems use pseudo-random
number generators (PRNGs), which function through algorithmic means. This type of RNG requires a seed,
which in itself should be statistically random and irreproducible, because if the seed is compromised, then the
resulting random numbers are also compromised. Implementations such as the Java function call SecureRandom
use a mixture of truly random and pseudorandom data, often starting with a TRN as the function seed. Other
PRNGs use statistical methods such as Monte Carlo techniques, or Lorenz systems (Lynnyk, Sakamoto, &
Celikovsky, 2015). In the case of Lynnyk, Nakamoto and Celikovsky (2015), a TRN was used to produce the
seed for the algorithmic PRNG. In Barker and Kelsey (2015), the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family is
recommended for use in deterministic random number generation using irreproducible and statistically random
seeds.

RADIO ASTRONOMY
Radio Astronomy is the discipline of science using antennae or radio telescopes to detect the emission of celestial
sources in the electromagnetic frequency range of 10 6 Hz to 109 Hz (Shuch, 2013). Radio telescopes allow
astronomers to peer through not only the layers of our atmosphere but in frequencies beyond the human eye’s
capability into interstellar clouds of particles, thereby determining the chemistry and physics behind the
astronomical phenomena of our universe (Dougherty, 2011).
At 30.48 metres in diameter, the Warkworth 2 antennae was licensed from Telecom and converted in 2010 by the
Institute for Radio Astronomy and Space Research (IRASR) of Auckland University of Technology (AUT)
(Murphy, 2010). This took it from an international telecommunications satellite dish to a radio telescope as part
of the Warkworth Radio Astronomical Observatory (WRAO). The telescope is a reflector on a wheel and track
with a beam waveguide feed (Woodburn et al., 2015). NEC Corporation of Japan originally built the dish for the
Post Office (later Telecom) in 1984 as part of Warkworth Satellite Earth Station, which is located 5 km south of
Warkworth and 60 km north of Auckland, in New Zealand’s North Island (Ministry of Culture and Heritage,
2013).
The majority of astronomical objects give off radiation for astronomers to detect, but some have much greater
emissions including pulsars, quasars, certain nebulae, and radio galaxies (The Editors of Encyclopædia
Britannica, 2016). In 1931, Karl Jansky worked on improving the operation of transoceanic radio links for Bell
Laboratories. The “steady hiss static” that he recorded became the origin of radio astronomy, and now the
strength, or spectral flux density of a radio source is measured in Janskys (Jy), where 1 Jy = 10-26 Wm-2Hz-1
(Jansky, 1979).
Radio astronomy signals are inherently random, “a specific property of astronomical observations is that they
cannot be repeated under the exact same conditions” (Junklewitz, 2014, p.13). The astrophysical source signal
and the telescope system noise are both Gaussian distributed (Burke and Graham-Smith, 2002). The signal
available at the output of a radio telescope consists of the combination of system noise (internally generated
noise), a 2.73 Kelvin component from Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation, noise power from the celestial
source of interest (the “signal”) and typically interference signals picked up from the surrounding terrain
(Campbell, 2002). The influence of the amplifier increases the amplitude of both “signal” and noise whilst a
linear (frequency independent) response of the receiving system will preserve the statistical distribution of the
input signal and result in a Gaussian output signal (Haykin, 2009).

Figure a: Random Process (Hsu, 2013, p. 393)
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Due to the random nature of all the processes contributing to the final receiver output signal it is not normally
possible to distinguish between the various components from a study of the output signal. Using the sum of all
these signals, and recognizing the implausibility of another party replicating the uniqueness of the system noise
component(s) confers a distinct advantage for recording a unique source of randomly generated data (Burke and
Graham-Smith, 2002). An illustrated example of how our recorded signal is a statistically random process is
shown in Figures A and B.

Figure b: Random sequence of data bits 1 or 0 produced by a Random Process
(Hsu, 2013, p. 393)

DATA COLLECTION
The data used in this research was collected at the WRAO. The two sources chosen for data collection were the
bright Maser 309.92+0.47, hereafter referred to as “G309” (coordinates 13h 50mins 41.78s RA and -61º 35’ 10.2”
DEC) and M17 (18h 20mins 26s RA and -16º 10' 36" DEC) from the J2000 epoch. G309 is a methanol maser; an
interstellar cloud of methanol (CH3OH) molecules that emits at a frequency of approximately 6.7 GHz (in the
laboratory/rest frame). Photons are released when these particular molecules change their angular momentum via
a transition between allowed quantum rotational states. In the J/A+A/432/737 General Catalogue of 6.7GHz
Methanol Masers, G309 has a flux of approximately 780 Jy (Pestalozzi and Chrysostomou, 2005). The methanol
maser is 5.3 kiloparsecs (kpc) or 17.2 kilo-lightyears (kly) distant from Earth (Phillips, Norris, Ellingsen, &
McCulloch, 1998). M17 is a nebula containing an open cluster of stars called NGC6618. The cluster is an HII
star-forming region, an ionised cloud of Hydrogen that radiates by a thermal emission process. M17 is at 1.6 kpc
distance and observed total flux is some 687 Jy (Povich et al., 2007).
Signal from the right hand circular polarisation (RCP) of the telescopes C band receiver was processed by a chain
of backend electronics consisting of a “front end” Low Noise Amplifier (LNA), a down-converter that selected
and mixed a 6.5-6.8 GHz “RF/Sky” band of signal down to a 300 MHz wide band centred on 825 MHz and
finally to an RTL-SDR for further filtering, amplification and digitisation of the signal. Down conversion to the
Intermediate Frequency (IF) band at 825 MHz is achieved by selecting the lower side band result of mixing the
RF/Sky band with a 5.8 GHz signal from a Local Oscillator (LO) locked to the WRAO Hydrogen Maser
(Woodburn et al., 2015):

The down converted band was conveyed by a short length (≈0.5 m) of coaxial cable that also converted from the
type N output connector of the C band downconverter to the MCX input of the RTL-SDR. Equipped with a
RTL2838U chipset the RTL-SDR Software Defined Radio (SDR) dongle was plugged into a USB 2.0 port of a
Unix based laptop (provided by IRASR) The dongle was tuned to 825 MHz and set to a gain of 40 dB by
constructing a simple GUI interface in the free GNU Radio Companion (GRC) software package (West, 2006).
The digitized 8 bit data was interleaved into in-phase (I) and quadrature phase (Q) streams produced by the
dongle. The raw data streams were processed by a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) GRC block to produce a
spectrum for visual monitoring of the recorded signal. The LO was turned on and off, the response assured a
signal was being recorded from fsky. The actual recording of signals was initiated using appropriate commands
from the rtl_sdr driver package (obtained from git clone git://git.osmocom.org/rtl-sdr.git). Approximately 400MB
of raw data was recorded from each of our sources, for ≈ 1 min each, into 2 binary seed files. This data was then
pre-processed using hex dump into text files each containing a 128 bit line of received data in hexadecimal
format.
As part of the process of determining correct operation of the system the telescope was first pointed at Centaurus
A (NGC5128), a Seyfert galaxy (13h25m27.6s RA, -43d01m09s DEC). A pointing observation was run, stepping
through a grid of 9 points offset from the nominal position in both azimuth and elevation. The received power
levels obtained for all offset positions where then subjected to a least squares fit (Gaussian peak on a straight line
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background) to determine offsets of the flux peak. Offsets of 0.04º in azimuth and 0.03º in elevation where
determined and then applied to subsequent source observations. With calibration of pointing offsets applied the
telescope was then focused on G309 and M17 in sequence and data files recorded for analysis as described above.

RESULTS
The data collected from the sources G309 and M17 was processed for testing using Java. All processing and
testing was completed on a Unix-based machine configured with 16GB 1867 MHz DDR3 RAM and a 3.1 GHz
Intel Core i7 processor. The Java code stripped the index numbering from the lines in the hex dump file, and
removed all excess white space. Each of the 128-bit lines of data were then individually used as a seed for
hashing into random numbers. As per the NIST recommendations (Barker & Kelsey, 2015), we utilised the SHA
family of algorithms for the purpose of randomness extraction, specifically the SHA-256 algorithm (Dang, 2015).
The output of this process was then written to a binary file for testing purposes.
The first set of tests performed on our data were completed in R, version 3.3.1, which offers several libraries for
the analysis of random data. The randtests package created by Mateus & Caeiro (2014) offer tests which examine
the vector data read through a binary file and offer a p-value as the output. A p-value of greater than then
significance level a = 0.05 gives the sequence a pass, while a p-value of less than a = 0.05 means the test has
rejected the null hypothesis. The binary file for each source was read into a vector of integer elements, with 2
bytes to each integer value. The data was subjected to the Bartels Rank Test (Bartels, 1982), the Cox Stuart Test
(Cox & Stuart, 1955), the Difference Sign Test (Moore & Wallis, 1943), and the Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Test
(Wald & Wolfovitz, 1940) for continuous data. In all tests, the p-value result was greater than a, meaning the data
passed the test. In comparing the two data sets, we found that the data gathered from M17 offered better results
than that gathered from G309. We speculate that this may be due to the inherent nature of each of the sources, as
M17 is a weaker and more generally dispersed source than G309. Further investigation is required for a definitive
resolution to this speculation.
Table 1 shows the results of the testing for both sources, as well as values generated through Java’s
SecureRandom function, used as our control group. The control data was similarly hashed with the SHA-256
algorithm, and read in to integer values 2 bytes at a time.
Table 1: Results of testing in R's randtests package (4 d.p.)
Test

M17

G309

Control

Bartel’s rank test

0.5922

0.4317

0.5633

Cox Stuart test

0.7919

0.05636

0.138

Difference sign test

0.6885

0.4409

0.5945

Wald-Wolfowitz runs test

0.4372

0.2941

0.353

The hashed M17 data gave a better performance on the tests than the control group, of the hashed
SecureRandom numbers, while G309 resulted in the worst performance of the test sets. Table 2 shows the
entropy values of the data sets, both pre- and post-hashing, which were calculated using the Dirichletmultinomial pseudo count model with Bayesian estimates using Laplace’s prior (a=1) in the entropy R package
(Hausser & Strimmer, 2009). The entropy value of the pre-hashed astronomical data in comparison with the
control group of the data generated using the SecureRandom function suggests that the use of celestial sources
provides data with a superior level of entropy for use in cryptographic functions.
Table 2: Data Entropy Values as per R's entropy package (5 d.p.)
Data set

Entropy pre-processing

Entropy post-processing

M17

16.11105

15.92491

G309

16.10822

15.92499

Control

15.89529

15.92493
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The histograms for each of the data sets were also computed, both for the unprocessed stream received from the
radio telescope, which presents a Gaussian distribution, and for the hashed data, which results in a visibly
uniform distribution. Figure C shows the histogram for the unprocessed data gathered from M17, while Figure
D shows the post-hashing data for M17 once it was fed through the SHA-256 algorithm. Figure E meanwhile
displays the histogram for G309 pre-processing, and Figure F gives the histogram for G309 post-hashing.

Figure c: M17 data distribution frequencies, per one million bits

Figure d: Hashed M17 data distribution frequencies, per one million bits.
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Figure e: G309 data distribution frequencies, per one million bits.

Figure f: Hashed G309 data distribution frequencies, per one million bits.
Based on the results of testing in the randtests suite, a second set of testing was conducted using the NIST
Statistical Test Suite (Rukhin et al., 2010), which conducts 15 tests for randomness in binary data. The binary
files input to this program were the same ones used for the testing in R, and the bitstream length was set to
for 256 streams of data.
Table 3 gives the results of testing in the NIST STS. All data sets passed all 15 of the tests for randomness, with
97% or more of the streams passing each. For all data sets the results are within a few percentage points of one
another, suggesting highly comparable values. For tests such as the non-periodic template matching test, which
returned multiple results for each data set, the mean value was calculated from all returned values for that test.
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Table 3: Results from testing in the NIST Statistical Test Suite (4 d.p.)
M17

Test

G309

Control

p-val

%

p-val

%

p-val

%

Frequency

0.7637

99.6094

0.6828

98.8281

0.0835

99.6093

Block Frequency

0.3012

98.0469

0.4484

98.4375

0.8237

98.8281

Cumulative Sums

0.7455

100

0.7065

99.2188

0.5834

99.4141

Runs

0.4711

98.8281

0.6993

98.4375

0.6993

98.8281

Longest Run of 1s

0.5022

97.2656

0.7637

99.2188

0.4559

100

Rank

0.9769

99.2188

0.5667

98.8281

0.1167

99.6093

DFT

0.1681

98.4375

0.2954

99.6094

0.0989

99.2188

Non-periodic Template Matching

0.4805

98.9627

0.4974

98.9390

0.5262

98.9733

Overlapping Template Matching

0.1038

98.0469

0.4788

99.2188

0.5194

98.0469

Universal Statistical

0.0815

99.2188

0.9114

99.2188

0.2320

98.4375

Approximate Entropy

0.3191

98.4375

0.5914

100

0.9114

97.6563

Random Excursions

0.5232

99.0783

0.5166

99.2477

0.4923

98.2981

Random Excursions Variant

0.4301

99.2832

0.6290

98.9712

0.4117

98.9306

Serial

0.3169

99.2188

0.6696

99.2188

0.4541

99.2188

Linear Complexity

0.5667

98.0469

0.8092

98.8281

0.2272

99.2188

Figure G gives the graphed percentages of the NIST STS results for each of the data sources. The overall mean
of the percentage of bitstreams which pass the tests for the two celestial sources is within 0.02% of the control
group, with 98.9% of the 512 bitstreams passing the tests.

Figure g: Percentage of bitstreams which passed the NIST testing for each data source.
The results of the testing suggest that data gathered through radio astronomy may present a viable option for use
as seeds for cryptographic application. The wide variety in data due to fluctuations in machinery, inconsistent
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radiation from sources, and interference from satellites and other space junk offers a continuous stream of
irreproducible random bits. The time taken to gather the data used in the testing, approximately 400MB worth
for each source, was approximately one minute per source. The resulting performance of the data with the SHA256 algorithm shows it may be a viable option for security applications. As such, it offers a new, rapid and
efficient method of gathering irreproducible seeding for random number generation.

CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented an alternative method for the collection of seed data for random number
generators. Utilising the inherent randomness and irreproducibility of radio signal data from celestial sources
presents what our results appear to show is a viable method for collecting vast amounts of seed data for use in
RNG. The data sets tested all offered high performance levels in the statistical tests for randomness, over long
period bitstreams. This suggests that astronomical data retrieved from celestial sources presents a viable option
for use in implementing secure systems, and cryptographic functions such as SHA-256. With the ever increasing
demand for secure systems, the need for seed data for random numbers is growing rapidly and our results suggest
the large volume of data that is available through radio astronomy offers a scheme for addressing this growing
demand.
Further research is necessary to determine the most effective use of this type of astronomical data in
cryptographic applications. Examination of other sources to examine the best types of celestial events to collect
seed data from, as well as collecting and comparing data from other radio telescopes, would be a prudent next
step, as would testing the astronomical data with multiple different RNGs for performance. However, the data
presented in this paper offers a feasible beginning to such research.
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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) is having a more important role in the everyday lives of people. The distribution of
connectivity across social and personal interaction discloses personalised information and gives access to a sphere
of sensitivities that were previously masked. Privacy measures and security to protect personal sensitivities are
weak and in their infancy. In this paper we review the issue of privacy in the context of IoT open-source projects,
and the IoT security concerns. A proposal is made to create a privacy bubble around the interoperability of devices
and systems and a filter layer to mitigate the exploitation of personal and private information by marketing
companies.
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INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of technical capability to sponsor the Internet of Things (IoT) has also impacted the daily
lives of millions of people. The ability for devices and applications to provide personal services for millions of
people on a moment by moment basis, has also removed immediately barriers from personal choices, behaviours
and habits. The rich information around individuals opens new marketing opportunities and information
opportunities for third-party exploitation. The question of privacy, concerns access to personal information. In the
case of IoT private information has the same status as any information and can become readily available to multiple
layers of interested parties (Weber, 2010). The bigger issue is that much of this information can be collected
unknown to the end user of the IoT. The concept of the smart home, the smart car, the smart phone and other
technologies, has introduced a relationship where the gap between the human and the technology is narrowed. Every
movement, motion and breath of life of the human can be monitored by sensor networks and transmitted across
multiple layers of interested parties. In a medical applications this may be immensely beneficial (Wan et al., 2013).
However, the human may resist when they are bombarded by multiple advertising campaigns driven by harvested
data from behavioural sensors and the invitation materialize in their weakest and strongest emotional moments.
Privacy and privacy protection is hence a central concern when developing open source projects.
Challenges however arise in terms of scalability. IoT applications that require large numbers of devices are often
difficult to implement because of the restrictions on time, memory, processing, and energy constraints (Tan, 2011).
For example, calculation of daily temperature variations around all of the country may require millions of devices
and result in unmanageable amounts of data. The deployment of hardware in IoT often has different operating
characteristics, such as sampling rates and error distributions, interoperability protocols and complex sensors and
actuators components. All of these factors contribute to the formation of the heterogeneous network of IoT in which
the data of IoT will also be heterogeneous and require a multiplicity of management systems. IoT not only has the
same security issues as sensor networks, mobile communications networks and the Internet, but also has its other
vulnerabilities such as privacy protection, different authentication compliance, access control network configuration
issues, information storage and management problems, and so on. Data and privacy protection is one of the
application challenges of IoT (Chen et al, 2009). One risk is of the IoT security is from itself, and the other one
comes from the related technology of construction and implementation of the network functions. IoT itself is the
integration of multiple heterogeneous networks. There are compatibility issues between different networks and they
are prone to security issues. For example, it is difficult to establish the junction of relationship as the relationship of
trust between nodes is constantly changing and this requires a dynamic solution (Jing et al., 2014). The application
of IoT directly connects with people’s everyday lives and has application in many different fields, for example:
patient’s remote monitoring, energy consumption control, traffic control, smart parking systems, inventory
management, production chains, customization of the shopping at the supermarket, and civil protection. For all of
the uses, users require the protection of their personal information related to their movements, habits and
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interactions with other people. They also require their privacy be guaranteed. In the literature, there are some
attempts to address such problems (eg. Fabian and Gunther, 2009).

VULNERABILITIES OF IoT
IoT must ensure the security of all layers. In addition, IoT security should also include the security of whole system
crossing the perception layer, transportation layer and application layer. The Perception layer includes RFID
security, WSNs security, RSN security and any others. Transportation layer includes access network security, core
network security and local network security. In addition there are application layer security concerns such as, 3G
access network security, Ad-Hoc network security, WiFi security and so on. Different network transmission has
different technology. The Application layer includes the application support layer and specific IoT applications. The
security in the support layer includes middleware technology security, cloud computing platform security and so on.
IoT applications in different industries have different application requirements but each requires similar diligence
for protective mechanisms (Suo et al., 2013).
IoT divides into three layers: the perception layer, the transportation layer and the application layer (Tsai et al.,
2014). Each of these layers further resolves into layer elements that differentiate the service provided. In figure 1 a
full summary is made of the security architecture for IoT.

Figure 1. Security architecture of IoT (Tsai et al., 2014).
The technical architecture of the IoT has an impact on the security and privacy of the participating stakeholders.
Privacy includes the concealment of personal information as well as the ability to control what happens with the
information (De Turck et al., 2002; Tan and Han, 2011). The right to privacy can be considered as either a basic and
inalienable human right, or as a personal right or possession. The attribution of tags to objects may not be known to
users, and there may not be an acoustic or visual signal to draw the attention of the object’s user. Thereby,
individuals can be followed without them knowing. Electronic traces are left of their data and movement that remain
in memory and in cyber- space. Further aggravating the problem (Ukil et al., 2014), it is not anymore only the
authorities that are interested in collecting the respective data, but also private actors such as marketing enterprises.
Since business processes are concerned, a high degree of reliability is needed. In the literature, the following
security and privacy requirements are described (Akyildiz et al., 2002; Evans and Eyers, 2012):


Resilience to attacks: The system has to avoid single points of failure and should adjust
itself to node failures.
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authenticated.
data provided.

Data authentication: As a principle, retrieved address and object information must be
Access control: Information providers must be able to implement access control on the

Client privacy: Measures need to be taken that only the information provider is able to
infer from observing the use of the lookup system related to a specific customer; at least, inference should
be very hard to conduct.

These requirements begin to shape the design of a bubble of protection that can be created around a participant in an
IoT environment. However further work is required to have policies for the erasure of data that relates to personal
activity, and the protection of all data from parties who wish to exploit it for economic gain (Juels, 2006; Aleaide et
al., 2013).

PRIVACY CONCERNS OF IoT
The fulfilment of customer privacy requirements is a challenging problem. A number of technologies have been
developed in order to achieve information privacy goals. These Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) can be
described in short as follows (Fabian et al., 2007; Haitao and Ting, 2012):


Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are extranets established by close groups of business
partners. As only partners have access, they promise to be confidential and have integrity. However, this
solution does not allow for a dynamic global information exchange and is impractical with regard to third
parties beyond the borders of the extranet.



Transport Layer Security (TLS), based on an appropriate global trust structure, could
also improve confidentiality and integrity of the IoT. However, as each ONS delegation step requires a new
TLS connection, the search of information would be negatively affected by many additional layers.



DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) make use of public-key cryptography to sign
resource records in order to guarantee origin authenticity and integrity of delivered information. However,
DNSSEC could only assure global ONS information authenticity if the entire Internet community adopts it.



Onion Routing encrypts and mixes Internet traffic from many different sources, i.e.
data is wrapped into multiple encryption layers, using the public keys of the onion routers on the
transmission path. This process would impede matching a particular Internet Protocol packet to a particular
source. However, onion routing increases waiting times and thereby results in performance issues.



Private Information Retrieval (PIR) systems conceal which customer is interested in
which information, once the EPCIS have been located. However, problems of scalability and key
management, as well as performance issues would arise in a globally accessible system such as the ONS,
which makes this method impractical.



A further method to increase security and privacy are Peer- to-Peer (P2P) systems,
which generally show good scalability and performance in the applications.

The following are reviewed literature provides further information regarding the privacy elements in a security
bubble for an IoT user. In Gurses et al. (2006) a data tagging for managing privacy in IoT is proposed. Using
techniques taken from the Information Flow Control, data representing network events can be tagged with several
privacy properties; such tags allow the system to reason about the flows of data and preserve the privacy of
individuals. Although exploiting tagging within resource-constrained sensor nodes may not be a viable solution
because tags may be too large with respect to the data size and sensitivity, therefore they generate an excessive
overhead. Clearly, in this case it is not suitable for IoT. In Huang et al. (2012) a user-controlled privacy-preserved
access control protocol is proposed, based on context-aware and anonymity privacy policies. The privacy protection
mechanisms are investigated in the research and the users can control which of their personal data is being collected
and accessed, who is collecting and accessing such data, and when this happens. In Cao et al., (2011) it is presented
Continuously Anonymizing streaming data via adaptive clustering (CASTLE). It is a cluster-based scheme which
ensures anonymity, freshness, and delay constraints on data streams, thus enhancing those privacy preserving
techniques (e.g., k-anonymity) that are designed for static data sets and not for continuous, unbounded, and transient
streams.
In Aleaide (2013), the traditional privacy mechanisms are divided into two categories: Discretionary Access and
Limited Access. The former addresses the minimum privacy risks, in order to prevent the disclosure or the cloning
of sensitive data; whereas the latter aims at limiting the security access to avoid malicious unauthorized attacks.
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Blass et al. (2011) analyses the privacy risk that occurs when a static domain name is assigned to a specified IoT
node. In this work the authors propose a privacy protection enhanced DNS (Domain Name System) for smart
devices, which can authenticate the original user’s identity and reject illegal access to the smart device. The scheme
is compatible with widely used DNS and DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) protocols. In
Elkhiyaoui et al., (2012) a fully decentralized anonymous authentication protocol for privacy-preserving targetdriven IoT applications is presented. Such a proposal is based on a multi-show credential system where different
showings of the same credential cannot be linked together, therefore avoiding the generating keys to be discovered.
The system defines two possible roles for participant nodes. There are users, which represent the nodes originating
the data, and data collectors, which are responsible for gathering the data from authorized users. Users can
anonymously and unlinkably authenticate themselves in front of data collectors proving the owning of a valid
Anonymous Access credential (AAC) encoding a particular set of attributes, established by the system itself. The
protocol is divided in three phases: set-up, user registration, during which users obtain Anonymous Access
Credentials, and Credential Proving, during which users prove the possession of a valid AAC to a data collector.
Such a protocol guarantees: user anonymity, AAC un-linkability (no Data Collector or set of colluding Data
Collectors can link two transactions to the same User), resistance to user impersonation, faulty and selfish nodes,
nodes hindering the efficiency, and adversary controlling the Data Collectors. Moreover, such a system relies on a
fully distributed approach, thus avoiding single point of failure issues. Sunmaker et al. (2010), starting from the
privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) techniques, and aims at minimizing the sensitive data disclosure probability
and the sensitive content analysis. In such a work, the user privacy awareness issue is addressed, proposing a
privacy management scheme which enables the user to estimate the risk of sharing sensitive data. It also aims at
developing a robust sensitivity detection system, able to quantify the privacy content of the information (Hachem et
al., 2011).

USE CASES
Amazon Echo is a small hands-free wireless speaker that is controlled by voice. The voice command technology
called “Alexa,” that is inside Amazon Echo is now available on other devices, including the Amazon Fire TV and
the Amazon Echo Dot and Amazon Tap. These devices exhibit state-of-the-art artificial intelligence that facilitates
human requirements and human interaction. The concept is grown from a belief that all of human experience may
be represented by artificial intelligence that is supported by information technology and physical devices. The
information architecture shows voice command technology that allows the user to manage, control and demand
personal experiences. The information requirements are managed by sensors, processes and mediating software to
assure the end user has full connectivity. The IoT systems architecture is design for interoperability across different
requirements so that the system may be implemented in a home, a motor vehicle, a business, or any other social
situation. It allows artificial intelligence to control the requirements to satisfy the experience. The concept is that
Alexa is a human friendly personification that access an access point to a multitude of systems and services. It only
requires “invocation words” that tell Alexa what Skill or service that is to be activated. The communication requires
a person to say things like “Alexa, ask Scout to arm my security system” or “Alexa, ask Fitbit what my resting heart
rate is.” (Wan et al., 2011).
These use cases of IoT are being developed as open source projects. The developers are working to make it easier
for third-parties to create Skills that don’t require invocation words at all. For instance, smart home gadgets that
create Alexa Skills using Amazon’s open application programming interface (API) will get to use existing code and
standardized Alexa vocabulary for things like lights, switches, and thermostats. In this way the concept of the smart
home can be built around an IoT plan and human experience may be captured within the technological confines.
Software such as Alexa are leading the way for creative developers to design and implement this new future. To
utilize these technologies the user says the word “Alexa,” and from then on the automation monitors everything in
around the human experience. The concept is strong but the privacy issues still remain. Questions arise regarding
the supervision of these types of technologies. What happens if Echo is left unsupervised? The technologies are not
only smart in the sense that they may be communicated to deliver actions services and experiences, but they also
open the user to a global communication world through the IoT. The security wireless signals is notoriously
vulnerable to external influence making the human experience vulnerable to unintended failures. Similarly the
information generated regarding human behaviour may be recorded and transmitted for commercial interests.
Marketing for example may become more targeted and better represent a requirement within the human life world.
To some this may be a benefit but to others it may be deemed invasive (Wang and Wen, 2011).

17

Commercial interests are in the business of selling everything humans need from clothes to groceries, electronics
goods, gifts and so on. To do that better and more efficiently, they need to know more about their users, their
friends, their family and social networks. By knowing more about the users’ information, they can better suggest
new experiences for purchase, and to exactly time when to make the offer. Some of the characteristics collected by
Alexa (through Echo) are:







Unique home occupants: Echo is able to distinguish between the numbers of unique voices in a home and
to map these voices onto registered users and images of people in the home.
Home visitors: Echo can identify and monitor who comes to a home. This is for intended and unintended
visitors, such as friends and burglars.
Gender and age: From voice and photographic data trapped by Echo gender and age may be estimated.
Happiness, sadness, anger: emotional states can be monitored and moods such as happiness and sadness,
anger and delight, and so on can be instantaneously recorded and transmitted.
Who is home: Echo can learn patterns of behaviour and detect movement within a home. From this
learning real-time being is established and also all the interactions are accessible.
What we watch and listen to: Echo can hear everything that is going on that includes preferences for
television channels, music, statements about products being used, political statements, personal relationship
statements, and so on, and so on. Such data provides up-to-date information on personal preferences
although the human may not be conscious that these things are being recorded and matched against
patterns.

To create a privacy bubble around the human some security features have already been built into Alexa. However
the technology can do a lot if left unsupervised that not only includes cleaning the house but also being responsive
to multiple layers of communication networks from outside of the home. One of the things that has been done to
quell some of the automation fears is to add a variety of voice controls that put the technology into various sleep
modes. These types of controls are necessary if the human is to maintain control over their private information that
includes movements, locations, emotions, habits, and many other personalised information is that would not
normally be made public. The intrusion of commercial interest into the spaces and the precision with which
generalizations can be made is a new phenomenon. These are matters that the IoT has introduced (Yang and Fang,
2011; Jing et al., 2014).
Privacy security bubble
Our advocacy in this paper, after the review of the relevant literature, is to have a proximity around technology in
which the user has protection for the use of their information. To achieve this the user must first be given the rights
of ownership to their own information. At present within the multiple layers of system the content created within a
word processor for example may have multiple ownership challenges. The user and creator of the content may not
be aware of these competing digital rights that are behind what they are doing. In a similar sense people using robot
vacuum cleaners, automated software on their mobile phone, motor vehicles, hospital services, financial services,
and so on, may not be aware, and in effect may not have the digital rights to the content that they have created with
the efficacy of their presence and actions. The privacy requirement in IoT is currently inadequately unaddressed and
there is a wide set of research issues yet to be investigated. Privacy policies starting from a well-defined model and
the correspondent development of policies that adequately deal with the scalability and the dynamic environment
characterizes IoT scenarios are required. Capturing privacy requirements in the very early stages of project
development is essential for creating public confidence and the adoption of novel IoT systems. Private enterprises
using IoT technology will have to include these requirements into their risk management plans for governing the
business activities in general.
The IoT is susceptible to intentional and unintentional compromise of information. The complexity of IoT security
was shown in figure 1. Usual Internet services and other communication services are familiar with protection for the
transport and application layers. However the IoT introduces the concept of the perception layer. The perception
layer is made up of networks and nodes that are both social and machine. The mixing of these two elements in the
perception concept introduces an ambiguity that cannot be easily addressed. The issues of ownership around
information that is mediated and hosted by machines is much more difficult than the adjudication of common
property rights. The owners of the machines can lay claim to content, the owners of the software can lay claim to
content, and the user of the systems and the machines may not be in a position to realise that data has been created
regarding their own behaviours. The user of IoT experiences and services may also not be in a position to challenge
the owners of the technology and the hosted services. This therefore creates an imbalance of power that requires
redress in the fashion that we suggest whereby the user and participant in the IoT environment is given a proximity
measure in which they hold a primary ownership of the data. The management of such a privacy and security bubble
can be done by honouring the proximity metric and enforcing it transaction by transaction. This will require the
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partitioning of data into private and public categories at the point and within the modes of production. The
proximity measure can be enforced as a contractual arrangement and all the other interested parties must negotiate
with the human factor for access to any data created within the proximity boundary or from instances within the
proximity boundary. At present such arrangements are not in place and there is no boundary for privacy. The
privacy requirement in IoT is currently emerging issue by issue and it will only be when developers are impacted
financially by end user resistance that the problem will be taken seriously. Consideration is required for building the
privacy requirement into the front end of a project as a bubble of protection for the end-user. Suitable survey of
potential end users and full HCI analysis are necessary components of every project. Human factor vulnerability and
the potential exploitation of the personal data can be treated with these measures.

CONCLUSION
In this paper we have reviewed literature that addresses the security and privacy issues in the IoT. The use case of
Amazon's Alexa devices illustrates open source projects that are currently active and developing. Our consideration
is to assure that there is a bubble of security and privacy around the user experience so that they are adequately
protected from exploitation and manipulation by multiple parties who may get access through the technology. It
would be reasonable to have legislation that prescribes a proximity in terms of a physical metric around and IoT
user, and anything within that proximity is owned by the user. This would mean that advertising companies and
others who seek to exploit this information would have to gain permission from the owner of the information before
they use it. In a hospital situation the patient already signs away these rights but with a mobile device or the sensor
systems within a motor vehicle, the user is not aware of where their data is going, who was looking at it and who
may have access to use it. Privacy rights advocates have called for limits on the information that companies can
collect and use, but the truth is that our privacy is already being breached on a daily basis. However, that does not
mean that we should voluntarily give up more of our privacy through the purchasing of devices such as the Alexa
(Echo Dot), automated motor vehicles, or Pokémon applications.
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Abstract
Home and commercial alarms are an integral physical security measure that have become so commonplace that
little thought is given to the security that they may or may not provide. Whilst the focus has shifted from physical
security in the past to cyber security in the present, physical security for protecting assets may be just as
important for many business organisations. This research looks at 700 genuine alarm PIN codes chosen by
users to arm and disarm alarm systems in a commercial environment. A comparison is made with a study of
millions of PIN numbers unrelated to alarms to compare the results in order to allow a prediction of the alarm
codes utilised in these systems. Results show that PIN number for alarm codes are often chosen differently than
other PIN numbers and an analysis of the alarm codes gives an indication of how users choose codes. The codes
are ranked in various groupings and results show that a non-sequential brute force attack against an alarm
system using the results of this study greatly reduce the number of codes tried by an attacker before a disarming
code is discovered. The results can be used to assist users in choosing codes that are less predictable than the
codes that are often chosen today.
Keywords
alarm, PIN, security, crime, brute force attack

INTRODUCTION
Alarm systems are commonplace in business and domestic settings. Basic alarms to protect property have been
recorded as early as 386 BC where animals were used to guard valuables and objects and were placed in
positions so when disturbed would alert the occupants. Bellis (n.d) states that the history of locks date back
approximately 4000 years where a lock was found by archaeologists in the Khorsabad near Nivenah. The use of
alarm systems is twofold: to detect and alert the owners of property that a breach has occurred but equally to act
as a deterrent to would be offenders. Advertising the presence of an alarm system has shown to be something of
a deterrent to potential burglars, meaning often that the potential offenders will move on to a premises that does
not have an alarm. The New Zealand Police report that approximately 143 burglaries are committed each day
against business and domestic premises, but resolved cases only account for 13% of these break-ins. The
effectiveness of an alarm system therefore derives from advertising its presence and ensuring its effectiveness if
an offender is detected.
The most common method of authenticating to an alarm system is a code or PIN number. Most alarm systems
require a PIN number of at least 4 numbers, with many allowing up to 10 numbers or more. Whilst some alarms
have a lockout feature where multiple wrong codes will disable the keypad for a time or set off the alarm, many
alarm systems either don’t have this feature or do not have the feature enabled. Whilst longer codes are more
secure from a brute force attack, most PIN numbers are found to be 4 digits as this is easier to remember than
longer numbers and humans are incapable of choosing random numbers which leads to a level of predictability
of those PIN numbers (Gutmann,A. Volkamer,M. Renaud,K. 2016). This research looks at the process of
conducting an attack utilising a brute force method to find a PIN code for the alarm, but rather than utilising the
usual sequential attack beginning at 0000 and incrementing the code by one until successful, known codes are
analysed so that the attack can work through the more likely codes first and try the less likely codes last.
There are three different types of codes involved in an alarm system. These are the Master Code, Installer Code
and the Standard User Code. According to the Alarm Forum (n.d), the Master Code is a code which is most
commonly used and it acts as both a User code to arm and disarm the alarm and to enable resetting of user codes
on the alarm system. This code allows full usage however without access right to the alarm system’s control
panel, which can be performed with Installer Code. This type of code would allow full programming access to
change user codes if required (Monitoring Plus, 2006). This privilege is given to the Master code so the user
does not need to call the security company every time modification of user codes is required. The standard
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NZS2201:2007, the section 5.6.2 explicitly prohibits the reissue of the master code unless there is an extremely
unavoidable situation to do so. The user code is the most basic code with very limited access rights and which is
used to arm and disarm the system. This code has less privilege compared to the Master Code and the only
function of it is to arm and disarm the system.

Figure 1: Standard Alarm System Keypad
Keypads do not place a restriction on using the same number multiple times. Therefore, there are 10,000
possible four digit PIN number combinations from 0000-9999. An intruder may be able to attempt multiple
guesses of the PIN number before the alarm is activated. If a sensor is placed so that anyone gaining physical
access to the keypad alerts the system by activating the sensor, the intruder may be given a very short time to
enter a correct PIN number. This is often no more than 30 seconds before the alarm system responds with a siren
and may also dial a predetermined phone number to alert the recipient of the alarm activation. If a keypad is
placed where access can be gained without activating a sensor, as is often the case, the intruder may be able to
try many thousands of PIN numbers without activating the system. The possibility of an intruder trying
seemingly random numbers and finding a correct code in a short space of time is very unlikely. However, if
numbers are not chosen randomly but have some meaning to the user or are chosen for reasons that may be
common such as easy to remember combinations such as 1234, then the chances of success are greatly
increased.
In his research into 3.4 million PIN number in a database constructed from a variety of PIN numbers released
onto the Internet, Berry (2012) discovered certain numbers are chosen more frequently than others and argued
that people are not particularly strong at choosing a difficult to guess PIN number. The most common numbers
that are a variety of different PIN numbers but likely not alarm codes, as Berry was unable to ascertain exactly
where they had come from, are shown in table 1. By identifying the most popularly used PIN numbers and
performing a brute force attack to the system using these more common PIN numbers first, an intruder may
successfully gain entry to the premise in a much shorter time than simply systematically trying every number
from 0000 to 9999.
Table 1: Four digit PIN codes most commonly in use (Berry 2012)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

PIN

1234

1111

0000

1212

7777

1004

2000

4444

2222

6969

9999

3333

5555

6666

1122

1313

8888

4321

2001

1010

Freq

10

6.0

1.9

1.2

0.75

0.66

0.61

0.53

0.52

0.51

0.45

0.42

0.39

0.39

0.37

0.30

0.30

0.29

0.29

0.28

Rank

The following section describes the process of analysing PIN numbers to identify the most common types of
numbers and therefore predict what numbers are more likely to be chosen than others.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The researchers were able to obtain 700 genuine and freely chosen 4 digit alarm codes used in businesses in
New Zealand and these were used as the dataset for analysis. Experiments by the researcher utilising an alarm
keypad and stop watch found on average a person entering a 4 digit PIN number onto a keypad would take
approximately 5 seconds per PIN number. If using a brute force attack against a 4 digit PIN number trying all
possible 10,000 combinations, it would take an attacker approximately 50,000 seconds, which is 13.9 hours. If
the PIN numbers are chosen genuinely at random, then on average the number will be located in half that time.
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Rasmussen and Rudmin (2010) point out the problem of people’s difficulty with memorising number codes
causes problems. Although it is a well-known that longer and more complicated PIN codes are more difficult to
guess or crack, the lack of users’ ability to memorise more complex passcodes means a tendency to choose
numbers that are easy for them to remember and thus easier to guess or predict. Rasmussen and Rudmin (2012)
attempted to investigate people’s common strategies and difficulties when memorising a PIN number including
making a pattern on the keypad rather than remembering a series of numbers.
With this in mind, the focus becomes how best to predict a number or a method used by a user to choose as the
code. Whilst some codes are more likely to occur than others, the purpose of this research was to identify what
types of codes are more likely to be chosen, and therefore groups of ‘likely’ codes could be tried first. The brute
force attack could therefore begin with the most likely group, move on to the next most likely group and so on
until the final most unlikely group was the last to be tried. It was hoped that by analysing the 700 PIN codes,
groups of codes could be established greatly speeding up the success of a brute force attack. The first task was to
identify the PIN codes that were used multiple times. Initially the study by Berry was used to identify any
correlation between his study’s findings and the database of alarm codes. A comparison of these codes with the
alarm code database found that there was some relationship between the Berry findings and the alarm codes but
some specific codes had almost no relationship. For example, Berry found that the number ‘1234’ was utilised
over 10% of the time, whereas the alarm database found that it was used for 2 out of the 700 or 0.00314% of the
time. However, the use of repeating numbers within the code did occur frequently in the database as Berry had
found. Taking into consideration the study and findings of Berry (2012), his category of numbers was used
along with two additional categories, those PIN numbers beginning with 19?? and 20?? which may indicate a
year of significance to a user. Another category considered was a PIN number which is composed with a
sequential number either ascending or descending order. This category was considered due to its relative
simplicity for memorising PIN numbers in such characteristics and due to the fact that Berry (2012) has
identified 1234 as the most popularly used PIN numbers. Due to this, certain PIN numbers may fall into two
categories: such as PIN number 1999. This will fall into a category of a year, and also into a category of PIN
number that is composed with two different digits only. The following categories were chosen.

o

o

o

o

o

o

Category 1: PIN number is composed of four different digits
In this category, the code contains numbers that are all unique. That is, no number is repeated in the code
but the four numbers will form a certain pattern on the keypad.
Category 2: PIN number is composed of three different digits
In this category, 2 numbers are unique and one other number is repeated. On the keypad, this allows for a
code that can fit on a line composed of 3 numbers wide by repeating a number.
Category 3: PIN number is composed of two different digits
In this category there are only 2 numbers and either both are repeated once or one of those numbers is
repeated 3 times.
Category 4: PIN number is composed of one number only
In this category, a single number is used and repeated 4 times.
Category 5: PIN number with 19 or 20
In this category, the user has apparently chosen a recent year of significance
Category 6: PIN number with sequential numbering:
In this category, the user has chosen a PIN number with 4 digits in numerical ordering. This can be
ascending or descending starting from any digit.

By utilising these 6 broad categories, the numbers that may fit into those categories can be identified and then
their frequency in the database found. The first 3 categories focus on patterns that may be identified and
therefore more easily remembered. It was noted that there may be some numbers chosen by users for some
significance, but that coincidentally fit into a pattern such as a straight line. Additionally, some numbers will fit
into more than one category. These are identified and guidelines used to ensure that all numbers appear once in
the guideline and are not repeated. The next step in the process is to examine each category and construct more
specific sub-categories based on the codes physical appearance on the keypad. The aim of category 1 and 2 is to
identify all the possible patterns on a keypad that can be formed.
 Category 1: PIN number is composed of four different digits
1) Square (Four corners)
2) Four digits in the middle of the keypad making a vertical line
3) Diamond shape
4) Rectangle shape
5) L shape in any orientation
6) Reverse L shape in any orientation
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7) Y shape

Table 2: Category 1 Number Groupings
Number
PIN Number Combination

Pattern



Square (Four Corners)

24

Four digits in middle vertical line

2

Diamond shape

24

Rectangle shape

24

L shape

16

Y shape

24

Reverse L shape

16

1397, 1379, 1793, 1739, 1937, 1973
3971, 3791, 3179, 3917, 3719, 3197
9713, 9137, 9317, 9173, 9371, 9731
7139, 7913, 7931, 7391, 7193, 7319
2580, 0852
2684, 2648, 2486, 2468, 2846, 2864
6842, 6482, 6248, 6824, 6284, 6426
4268, 4826, 4862, 4683, 4628, 4268
8426, 8264, 8624, 8346, 8462, 842
1346, 1364, 1463, 1436, 1634, 1643
3461, 3641, 3146, 3614, 3416, 3164
4613, 4136, 4631, 4361, 4163, 4316
6134, 6413, 6314, 6143, 6341, 6431
1478, 2589, 3214, 6547, 9632, 8521, 7896, 4563
8741, 9852, 4123, 7456, 2369, 1258, 6987, 3654
1358, 1385, 1538, 1583, 1853, 1835
3581, 3851, 3815, 3158, 3185, 3518
5813, 5138, 5381, 5831, 5318, 5183
8135, 8513, 8153, 8315, 8531, 8315
3698, 2587, 6541, 9874, 8523, 7412, 7896, 4563
8963, 7852, 1456, 4789, 3258, 2147, 6987, 3654

Category 2: PIN number is composed of three different digits
1) Vertical line
2) Horizontal line
3) Diagonal line
Table 3: Category 2 Number Groupings

Pattern

Number

Vertical Line

24

Horizontal Line

18

Diagonal Line

12



PIN Number Combination
1147, 1447, 1477, 2258, 2558, 2588, 3369, 3669, 3699
7411, 7441, 7741, 8522, 8552, 8852, 9633, 9663, 9963
5800, 5880, 5580, 2588, 2558, 2588
1123, 1223, 1233, 4456, 4556, 4566, 7789, 7889, 7899
3211, 3221, 3321, 6544, 6554, 6654, 9877, 9887, 9987
7753, 7553, 7533, 9951, 9551, 9511
3577, 3557, 3357, 1599, 1559, 1159

Category 3 PIN number is composed of two different digits

There is no pattern for this category. However this category can be divided into two different sub categories for
this category which are:
1) 2 digits are repeated twice (for example, 1212)
2) One digit is repeated three times (for example, 1112)
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Table 4: Category 3 Number Groupings
Number
PIN Number Combination

Pattern
2 Digits Repeated twice

50
Times 9

(450)

2 Digits: 1 Repeated 3 Times

40
Times 9

(360)



11xx, 1x1x, x11x, x1x1, xx11
22xx, 2x2x, x22x, x2x2, xx22,
33xx, 3x3x, x33x, x3x3, xx33,
44xx, 4x4x, x44x, x4x4, xx44
55xx, 5x5x, x55x, x5x5, xx55
66xx, 6x6x, x66x, x6x6, xx66
77xx, 7x7x, x77x, x7x7, xx77
88xx, 8x8x, x88x, x8x8, xx88
99xx, 9x9x, x99x, x9x9, xx99
00xx, 0x0x, x00x, x0x0, xx00
111x, 11x1, 1x11, x111
222x, 22x2, 2x22, x222
333x, 33x3, 3x33, x333
444x, 44x4, 4x44, x444
555x, 55x5, 5x55, x555
666x, 66x6, 6x66, x666
777x, 77x7, 7x77, x777
888x, 88x8, 8x88, x888
999x, 99x9, 9x99, x999
000x, 00x0, 0x00, x000

Category 4: PIN number is composed of one number only
In this category, there is no pattern as a single digit is repeated 4 times.

Table 5: Category 4 Number Groupings
Number
PIN Number Combination

Pattern
1 Digit Repeated 4 times

10

1111, 2222, 3333, 4444, 5555
6666, 7777, 8888, 9999, 0000



Category 5: PIN number with 19 or 20
Whilst this does not represent a pattern, it would appear most likely that a date would have already past for
it to be of some personal significance. Therefore it is expected that codes beginning 19 will be more
frequent than those beginning with 20.

Pattern



Table 6: Category 5 Number Groupings
Number
PIN Number Combination

Begin 19

100

19xx

Begin 20

100

20xx

Category 6: PIN number with sequential numbering
This pattern is 4 digits in numerical ordering - the most basic of pins & therefore maybe occurring regularly
as the sequence is easy to remember.

Pattern

Table 7: Category 6 Number Groupings
Number
PIN Number Combination

4 digits in numerical order

7

0123, 1234, 2345, 3456, 4567,
5678, 6789

4 digits in numerical order in

7

9876, 8765, 7654, 6543, 5432,

25

reverse


4321, 3210

Category 7: 25 PIN numbers obtained from home alarm users.

Pattern
Test set of
genuine
alarm codes

Table 8: Test set of genuine alarm codes
Number
PIN Number Combination
30

0123, 0227, 0247, 0404, 0521, 0629, 0904, 1470,
1234, 1962, 2468, 2514, 2875, 3107, 4201, 4425,
4663, 4989, 4927, 5242, 5683, 7233, 7479, 7777,
7942, 8282, 8888, 8989, 9876, 9908

Once the categories of PIN numbers were chosen, the expectations of the analysis were then derived as follows:
A large number of PIN numbers in the database will at least belong to one of six categories.
1) The analysis by Berry (2012) and the analysis of the 700 PIN numbers will indicate relative similarity.
2) A specific category will be noticeably more popular than other categories
3) It is expected that the percentage of PIN numbers than do not belong to a category will not exceed
50%, since most categories were identified and users are assumed to choose a PIN number according to
its simplistic nature or a specific pattern
4) The specific most popular PIN number is expected to belong to one of the six categories
5) A brute force attack performed with the most popular PIN numbers and/or the most popular category
will reduce time taken for a successful brute force attack to at least half.

RESULTS & DISCUSSION
The 700 PIN numbers present in the database were examined and analysed according to their distinctive
characteristics including them into at least one of the categories. If a PIN number did not belong to at least one
category of the six defined, it was to be defined as no category PIN number. As an assumption was that people
would choose PIN numbers that were easy to memorise over random numbers, category 4 was the simplest
category and was expected to occupy at least one-third of the database. Category 1 and 2 dealt with PIN
numbers with a certain pattern, and since the initial assumption was that a significant percentage of users would
draw certain pattern on a keypad to aid themselves with memorising as discussed by Rasmussen and Rudmin
(2012), percentages of expected numbers of the 700 code dataset could be calculated and then measured against
what was actually present. The results are shown in Table 9.
Variance
Category 1
Category 2
Category 3
Category 4
Category 5
Category 6
No category
Total

Table 9: Pin Numbers by Primary Category
Expected
Actual
over/under expected
10%
1%
-9%
10%
0%
-10%
15%
8%
-7%
30%
1%
-29%
5%
4%
-1%
15%
1%
-14%
15%
85%
+70%
100%
100%

It was somewhat unexpected to observe that a large number of PIN numbers in the database did not belong to
any one of the six categories. 85%, which accounts for 595 PIN numbers did not belong to a category which
might hint that the alarm users were comfortable to select PIN numbers with no apparent pattern and memorise
them. This significantly deviated from initial expectation and findings of previously research where ease of
memorising the number in apparent patterns was a significant influencing factor. The aim of the research was to
identify users’ behaviour relating to choice of alarm codes and to show that a brute force attack would be
significantly more efficient by taking into consideration people’s behaviour. The initial results were tending
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towards showing that the results of the alarm code choice were different than for other types of PIN codes and
certainly greatly differed from the findings of Berry.
Expectation had been that category 1 would to compose about 10% of the database, that is, about 70 numbers
were to be expected in this category. Despite only two possible combinations available, the four digits in the
middle of the keypad were expected to appear more than other patterns in the category, due to its frequent
occurrence at the study by Berry (2012). Although there were more available combinations existed, Y shape was
not expected to appear as much due to more complicated nature of the pattern. For other patterns, at least half of
the available combinations were expected to appear in the database.
Variance
Square
Middle four digit
Diamond shape
Rectangle shape
L shape
Y shape
Reverse L shape
Total

Table 10: Pin Numbers Analysed In Category 1
Expected
Actual
over/under expected
12
1
-11
10
1
-9
12
0
-12
12
0
-12
8
2
-6
8
1
-7
8
3
-5
70
8

In general, all of the possible combinations in this category were heavily underestimated. The most distinctive
pattern in this category was the shapes that related to ‘L’ shape, whether it is reverse or straight L shape. Against
expectations, the middle four digits vertically down the keypad was not a common choice and appeared only
once in the database. In category 2 it was expected that approximately 10% of PIN numbers or 70 PIN numbers
would be present. However, none of the 700 PIN numbers in the database belonged to this category. In category
3 the initial expectation was that this category was to appear about 15%, which is about 105 PIN numbers. It
was found that only 56 or fewer than half expected belonged to this category. In category 4 210 numbers were
expected yet only 6 existed and in category 5, despite the simplicity involved in the numbers in the category, the
result was heavily under expected. The result analysed in this category significantly differed from the analysis
by Berry (2012), where all the PIN number combinations in this category were apparent in his top ten most
popular 4-digit PIN numbers. A noticeable behaviour is that the PIN numbers 1111 and 6666 are not present in
the database. These PIN numbers may avoided for most people due to concern of the PIN number 1111 or 1234
or superstition relating to 666. It is also interesting to note that PIN 0000 was not present which may indicate
that the commercial nature of the dataset had led to a requirement to change the default codes, something that
may not occur always on home alarm systems. The results are shown in figure 2.
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Figure 2: Most commonly chosen PIN numbers
It was decided to use these 12 categories as the test categories. Added to this at the head of the list is a 13 th
category, one number repeated twice. Whilst this does not form a pattern, it was found to be the most common
approach to choosing a number. Finally, the 30 test PIN numbers were analysed utilising the standard sequential
brute force attack and this was compared with the modified brute force attack. These 30 test PINs were obtained
by asking people known to the researcher, and who had home alarm systems, what numbers they had used in the
past or currently used. The purpose is to test the modified attack on a distinct dataset to show that it is more
efficient than the standard attack. The process is to work through the categories of PIN numbers from most
likely to least likely and once all numbers in the categories have been exhausted, revert to a sequential brute
force attack on the remaining numbers. Table 11 shows the number of codes in each of the 13 categories.
Table 11: The 13 categories for the modified attack
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Category

1

2

3

Number

320

10

45

36

7

7

100

100

2

8

11

12

13

8

112

20

The problem of including shapes formed but out of sequence highlights the necessity to look carefully through
the chosen codes and plot them on the keypad. Selecting these numbers allows for easier memorisation but
makes it more difficult for the attacker unless they are aware of this type of behaviour.
Category
1
3
5
6
7
11
12
NIL

Table 12: Standard v Modified brute force attack
Code
0227 0904 4425 4663 4989 5242 7233 7479 9908
0404 8282 8989
0123 1234
9876
1962
2875
2514
0247 0521 0629 1470 2468 3107 4201 4927 5683 7777 7942 8888

The total number of PIN codes that could possibly fall into one of these 13 categories is 767 out of 10 000 codes
which equates to 7.67% of the codes. With 30 codes in the test dataset, it would therefore be expected that 2.3
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codes would be expected to be into one of these categories if chosen randomly. Results show that 18 of the 30
codes or 60% fell into these categories. This shows the effectiveness of the new attack with a well over 50%
chance that the code will be found in the first 767 codes attempted rather than 5000 attempts with the standard
brute force attack. However, it is not always the case that a code will be found more quickly with the modified
attack. Rather, on average the code will be found more quickly with the new attack. Overall the modified attack
is likely to lead to the code being found in much fewer attempts than the standard attack and therefore in a
quicker time on average of approximately 767 attempts multiplied by 5 seconds per attempt equates to 3835
seconds or just over one hour as opposed to almost 7 hours with the standard attack. This research shows that
the choosing PIN codes for alarms should be a robust process rather than allowing users to choose their own
codes where personal influences may lead to simplified attacks. These attacks can be mitigated by choosing
random numbers and by ensuring codes longer than 4 numbers are chosen. The preference should be for 6
numbers selected randomly to increase the time of this attack from just over one hour to 690 hours, or over 4
days with a manual attack and to place a sensor in sight of all keypads so that an attacker cannot enjoy the
luxury of time when mounting this attack, even when automated with the use of a computer.

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to determine whether alarm code PIN numbers were predictable by pattern of
frequency of chosen numbers. The study by Berry in 2012 of 3.4 million different PIN codes released on the
Internet was used as a basis for comparing the 700 genuine alarm codes obtained from a single source. Analysis
found that alarm code PIN number choice varies from PIN numbers utilised in other systems requiring a 4 digit
PIN number. However, some unique features were determined which would allow a brute force attack against
an alarm code to be simplified by trying more likely types of PIN numbers first and leaving the least likely PIN
number to last. While the results did not closely follow the Berry findings, this study has highlighted the
necessity for users to choose PIN number that are not easily predicted and utilise methods to memorise PIN
numbers that cannot be predicted by an attacker. Further research is planned where a physical implementation of
the attack will be performed utilising a laptop computer, an alarm system and a file of 10 000 Pin codes listed
from most to least likely. These will be read one at a time and tried against the alarm system so that the
improvement in speed in locating a number can be demonstrated. This research forms the basis of a guideline on
how users should select PIN numbers that are more secure than the numbers that are currently being chosen.
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Abstract
Block and stream ciphers have formed the traditional basis for the standardisation of commercial ciphers in the
DES, AES, RC4, and so on. More recently alternative graphic methods such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
have been adopted for performance gains. In this research we reviewed a range of graphic and non-graphic
methods and then designed our own cipher system based on several graphic methods, including Visual
Cryptography (VC). We then tested our cipher against RC4 and the AES algorithms for performance and security.
The results showed that a graphics based construct may deliver comparable or improved security and performance
in many of the required areas. These findings offer potential alternative avenues for post-quantum cryptographic
research.
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INTRODUCTION
The demand for cryptographic methods has always been strong. The ever-expanding use of technology for
communications, banking and financial transactions of diverse types, secure communications, and many other
Internet applications is driving current demand for security and performance. The consumers of cryptography
products require ever-increasing protection at lower cost (Thakur et al., 2011). Algorithms must maintain the
confidentiality of communications, the integrity of the messages, and the accessibility of information to the users.
The requirement for privacy of information has become increasingly challenging, caught in inter-jurisdictional
debates of legality and the ability of developers to provide the levels of protection required (Bhat et al., 2015). The
implementation of cryptographic algorithms in modern networked systems is crucial to ensure the users of
information are satisfied with the service they receive. Many standardised algorithms have come and gone as
vulnerabilities have been exploited to make algorithms unusable in the current cryptographic climate.
Events such as the theoretical cracking of the data encryption standard (DES), revisions including triple DES, and
the major competition that resulted in the adoption of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Fluhrer et al.,
2011; Singhal & Raina, 2011), illustrate the constant evolution of cryptography. While much research has been
done to improve the security of traditional ciphers such as the AES and the now-defunct Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4)
(Klien, 2008), there are opportunities for the development and improvement of alternative ciphers (Ustimenko,
2007). Our research focused on the potential of graphic methods. Encryption using Visual Cryptography (VC) and
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), is well-established and has been shown to give high levels of security,
improved performance, and reduced resource requirements. It also shows that that alternative competitors can be
found in graphic schemes. To demonstrate that there are alternative approaches to achieve secure methods for the
ever-expanding online world we constructed a word-oriented symmetric stream cipher. It was tested against AES,
RC4, ECC, and VC algorithms, and the results demonstrated that alternatives are possible using graphic schemes.
The proposed system was termed Coordinate Matrix Encryption (CME) to reflect the graphic construct behind the
algorithm (Galbraith & Menezes, 2005; Hou et al., 2014). It was implemented in Java along with the four competing
algorithms, and we tested both graphic-based and traditional cryptographic algorithms against our construct. The
algorithms were all tested for security, efficiency and resource consumption. The comparative results show the high
levels of security achievable by alternative graphic-based ciphers and the potential for alternative innovations. The
resistance of the proposed 8-bit CME system to brute force attacks was shown to be 157,899 orders of magnitude
higher than that of a 128-bit key in traditional ciphers such as AES. Examination of the avalanche effect of the CME
scheme showed that less than 0.5% of all bytes within the cipher text remained in the same position when a single
bit of the plaintext was altered. While the RC4 scheme offered the best efficiency in terms of time required to
encrypt and decrypt the data, it has been proven vulnerable; and the CME comparison showed lower memory
requirements and faster setup execution. This offers the potential for research, testing and implementation of
different approaches to make traditional cryptography adaptable to the new high-speed cyber connected world
(Vigila et al., 2009; Tawalbeh et al., 2013).
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GRAPHIC METHODS
Graphic-based systems rely on group theory and graph theory to create secure algorithms for encryption. Some of
the more popular graphic-based methods are ECC (Akhter, 2015) and VC (Blundo et al., 2006). However, there are
other algorithms that take advantage of the innate properties of group theory and families of graphs (Cohn, 2000;
Polak et al., 2013). These graphic methods for encryption exploit particular traits of certain types of graphs, such as
those using families of graphs of large girth, for example Cayley graphs. A Cayley graph is defined as a graph
G(G,S) where S is a non-empty subgroup of the group G, such that S is equal to its own inverse
, and the
set of vertices is equal to G, V=G, and the set of edge elements is:
A Cayley graph constructed in this manner is a regular graph, and the underlying algebraic structures of the family
of Cayley graphs can be exploited for use in encryption (Priyadarsini, 2015).
Another family of graphs providing a possible route for cryptographic research is the family of directed graphs of
large girth. The fact that there are only three families of undirected graphs of arbitrarily large girth limits their use,
however there are infinite numbers of algebraically constructed families of such graphs. These can be converted to
equivalent Turing machines of basic construction. The basic finite automaton is equitable to a directed graph, if the
memory component is ignored. These graphs are part of the expander family of graphs. Cayley graphs can be used
to describe a linear automata, while other graph families can be used to result in non-linear systems for encryption.
Encryption systems based around groups of graphs such as Cayley or expander families use sequences of vertices or
graph-colourings to create a cipher text. Others opt for using strongly regular graphs to generate a Hadamard matrix
for encoding images (Davidoff et al., 2003). Some systems use the vertices to represent the plaintext space and the
path within the graph becomes the password. Systems such as these based around walks along graph edges can be
used in the construction of stream ciphers. Expander graphs are also of interest in cryptography; they are sparse,
finite, and highly connected. Ramanujan graphs are a brand of expander graphs that are often used for encryption
(Agnarsson & Greenlaw, 2007).

Figure 1. A simple Cayley graph described by G=Z/6Z,S={1,-1}
New systems have been proposed that utilise group theory and rings to create encryption that relies on the
combining of two group elements. The reversing of these processes is impossible and hence establishes their
cryptographic value. Multivariate cryptography is the set of cryptosystems which use polynomials and finite
commutative rings for encryption, and these are part of the post-quantum cryptography movement (Ustimenko &
Romanczuk, 2013). The concepts of quantum cryptography have been used and applied to theoretically break many
standard cryptographic algorithms including the RSA. Post-quantum cryptography involves systems that are
theoretically resistant to adversaries using quantum attacks. Graphic methods have hence been explored as
possibilities in the post-quantum world, with the potential to define non-standard cryptographic methods that are
better and stronger than the new adversaries. New developments in graphic methods have used the injection of
algebraic geometry into the field of multivariate public key cryptosystems with outstanding effect (Blakley &
Kabatiansky, 2011). The structures are a set of multivariate quadratic polynomial equations over finite fields and
parameterised matrices for systems of para-unitary equations that deliver the cryptographic solution. Multivariate
polynomials are a solution to the problems of RSA and an alternative to systems like ECC, using multivariate
systems of equations over small fields, such as
where m is some small number. The use of multivariate
polynomials is a proposed solution to the issues with key size and set up time, both of which are high in
computational complexity and require large amounts of data to communicate. Multivariate systems generally use
quadratic polynomial fields. The multivariate systems rely on their own version of the one-way problem, in this case
called the MQ problem, based on the computational complexity of solving many different quadratic equations over
multiple different fields using many different variables (Chen et al., 2012; Sutter et al., 2013). The complexity of the
MQ problem has led to these graphic methods being proposed as a possible quantum-resistant encryption method.
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ISSUES WITH GRAPHIC METHODS
Encryption systems that use graphs for encoding, like those based around VC, can have very high computational
overhead, due to the size of the graphs required to achieve the required levels of security (Klein & Wessler, 2007).
Also, those encryption methods that base themselves around the special colourings of vertices and edges are
vulnerable to cubical linearization attacks, which make decryption possible, and are costly in practice. For those
graph-based systems that also rely on the DLP, the same vulnerabilities encountered by ECC encryption apply. The
biggest problem within graph based systems is implementation challenges. Representing a graph within a computer
program can be broken down into four possible objects for management: the adjacency list; the adjacency matrix;
the incidence list; and the incidence matrix. Each object lists either vertices or edges, and they are either enumerated
fully – in a matrix – or only where a connection occurs. These implementations affect the use of a particular system,
especially with larger connected graphs, with many entries in its matrix or list (Riaz & Ali, 2011).
The security of ECC relies on computational complexity to assure that it is intractable to compute the Elliptic Curve
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) (Yan, 2008). This reliance means that the security would be severely
compromised should the ever-increasing speed of technology provide a method of computing the solution to the
ECDLP in less than the current exponential time. On the realization of quantum computers, the Elliptic Curve
Discrete Logarithm problem will no longer be computationally infeasible to compute and exposing the algorithm to
an intractable vulnerability (Kramer, 2015). The weakness surrounding ECC in a post-quantum world is based on
Shor’s algorithm, operating on a quantum computer, which is capable of solving problems such as discrete
logarithms in minimal time. Aside from the possibility of breaking the Discrete Logarithm Problem, ECC also has
disadvantages in its implementation. It is highly complex to implement, and the resulting cipher text message is
increased in length from the original plaintext significantly (Akhier, 2015).
Advances in fields such as index calculus and number-field sieves have shown possible weaknesses in systems
based around the problem of computing discrete logarithms (Joux & Vitse, 2012). Index calculus, as a method of
computing discrete logarithms using probability and field arithmetic, which has been used by mathematicians to
exploit characteristics of groups and to then solve the original discrete logarithm problem (Agnarsson & Greenlaw,
2007). While classic index calculus has not been implemented successfully against general ECC systems, and
exponential time square root attacks are more efficient against these general ECC algorithms, the reduction in
computing time for solving the discrete logarithm problem in other systems may suggest weakness in the overall
computational complexity of DLP-based systems.
VC schemes encounter difficulties due to pixel expansion, the number of subpixels required to encode the correct
level of contrast in each share (Shyu et al., 2007). This expansion greatly affects the required overhead of VC
schemes, and as such is the target of much research. While there have been schemes proposed that give a constant
pixel expansion, such as graph-based extended VC (Lu et al., 2011), many schemes require linear, or even
polynomial pixel expansion based on the number of nodes within the scheme, making them infeasible for larger
implementations. Within the schemes which ensure pixel expansion remains constant, the overhead for the encoding
of the shares is still computationally high for large images with a greater numbers of pixels. These systems which
constrain pixel expansion also degrade the contrast of an image, as there are fewer subpixels differentiating dark and
light in the image, making it more difficult for the human eye to visually decode. Once multiple colours are
introduced to the scheme, pixel expansion becomes even more complex, and overall image contrast is lowered
further (Liu et al., 2008). A colour VC scheme will also require higher overall time complexity, as each colour
within the image must have a different threshold for contrast.
VC is also open to malicious man-in-the-middle attacks, during the transfer of shares to participants. If the shares
are intercepted, the malicious intermediary could keep the original share, and forward a new, false share to the
intended participant. The interception of the share would as such result in the security of the scheme being
completely undermined. Attacking a VC scheme in this manner is generally referred to as cheating. While this risk
can be decreased by the implementation of a filter where each participant is assigned a specific target image,
cheating is still possible, by a malicious participant. Cheating prevention VC schemes have been proposed that use
specific basis matrices in the generation of both the secret shares, and a set of verification shares, to counter the
ability to generate fake shares. These matrices add an extra column to the original matrices and hence extra cost.
The problem still remains however, that these basis matrix schemes are not immune to cheating. To prevent this
type of cheating, it is necessary to introduce multiple extra zero columns into the basis matrices that adds further
costs. As a result, cheating prevention VC schemes result in higher overheads and increased pixel expansion when
compared regular VC algorithms, which delivers a lower level of utility in real-world application. The proposal of
adding tags to individual shares to allow for the identification of false or forged shares may offer additional
protection against cheating, however it is still vulnerable to attack if an attacker is in possession of a genuine share,
and can therefore find and replicate the security tag (Wang & Hsu, 2011).
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ALGORITHM DESIGN
The algorithm design for the CME scheme was based around a square coordinate matrix and transformations in a
(Martin, 2012; Martinez & Encinas, 2013). The coordinate matrix design was structured by
finite Galois field
the concepts delivered in error-correcting codes, in which sparse matrices and code words are used to eliminate
noise from the transmissions. In addition, security principles from VC were applied. The main encryption process
uses a randomized coin toss style procedure, which is similar to the VC method of choosing whether a given pixel is
black or white. This coin toss decides if the next section of the cipher text is to be a blank padding section, or if it is
the next section of the plaintext message. If it is a blank padding section, one of the locations containing an empty
entry is picked at random from a blank list, and the binary or integer coordinates (depending on the implementation)
of that location are then input as the next part of the cipher text. Else, if the section is a part of the plaintext
message, then a location containing that bit string is randomly chosen from the list of locations for the string. The
location is then translated into the corresponding coordinates and concatenated to the cipher text. The scheme
involves the addition of exactly the same number of blank coordinates as enciphered message coordinates. As a
result of the addition of padding characters, the resulting cipher text is exactly four times the length of the plaintext,
with two coordinates for every message or padding character, and exactly the same number of padding and message
characters. The style of encryption means that the total length of the outputted cipher text is fixed at exactly four
times the length of the plaintext, which may prove to result in undesirable overheads for transmission.

Figure 2: A randomly generated key matrix for a 3-bit coordinate CME matrix scheme.
The use of multiple locations for each bit string and the addition of an equal number of padding coordinates at
random locations in the ciphertext provide resistance to cryptanalysis, and particularly to known and chosen
plaintext attacks, as the encryption process therefore results in a non-singular mapping. This non-singular mapping
means each plaintext input has many possible ciphertext outputs for any one key matrix. The multiple locations also
result in far more of the overall matrix being taken up by bit strings than would be the case if each string appeared
only once. Again, this helps prevent cryptanalytic attacks, as it increases the likely occurrence of the same of
padding coordinates appearing more than once, which is helpful in further confusing any analysis of the resulting
data. A sample of a 16-bit plaintext and the corresponding 64-bit ciphertext resulting from encryption using a 4-bit
coordinate matrix scheme is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Example plaintext ciphertext pair output from a 4-bit CME scheme.
The decryption process uses the same key matrix as in the encryption process and looks up each of the coordinates.
If a given coordinate is an empty padding variable, it is discarded. If not, the value of the coordinate is combined
with the next character of the key string using exclusive-OR, and the resulting value is added to the plaintext output.
In this manner, the extra noise generated by the encryption process to ensure security is efficiently removed during
decryption. Because each step of the decryption process consists only of simple entry check and exclusive-OR
operation, the overall efficiency for decrypting the ciphertext is theoretically higher than that of the encryption
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process.

TESTING AND RESULTS
The algorithm implementations were tested using Java, on an Intel i7 3.1GHz machine with 16GB of RAM. All
algorithms were tested for resistance to brute force, avalanche effect, set up requirements and encryption/decryption
time. Equation 1 shows the brute force analysis based on the key space for traditional 128-bit keys, while Equation
2 compares the resistance of the CME 8 and 4 bit schemes, based on the key space of the relevant matrix sizes. The
results of avalanche effect testing showed that when the 8-bit CME algorithm was trialled against RC4 and AES it
not only performed very well but outperformed the traditional algorithms, demonstrating the resilience of the CME
algorithm, shown in Table 1. Table 2 shows the results of avalanche testing of 4-bit CME against VC, in which both
algorithms achieved the maximum Hamming distance. Table 3 shows the set up time and memory requirements for
ECC, 8-bit CME, AES, RC4, and Table 4 shows the set up time and memory for VC and 4-bit CME.
Encryption/decryption times are given in Table 6 for AES, RC4, and 8-bit CME, and in Table 6 for 4-bit CME and
VC. These results appear to show CME as a potential competitor for streaming encryption.
Equation 1
Equation 2

Table 1: Comparative avalanche effect results with AES and RC4
Data Size
(bits)

Same Bytes (%)

Same Position (%)

RC4

AES

CME

RC4

AES

CME

304

97.668

37.767

44.839

97.368

24.779

0.414

928

99.472

62.777

84.026

99.145

38.905

0.388

3024

99.940

87.935

99.713

99.735

45.857

0.422

4408

99.979

94.276

99.984

99.819

48.227

0.404

8144

99.997

99.100

100

99.902

48.593

0.395

Table 2: Comparative avalanche effect results with 4-bit CME and VC
Data Size (bits)
16

% of Bits Unchanged
VC
49.275

CME 4-bit
50.319

32

50.169

50.619

64

50.005

50.499

128

49.934

50.286

256

49.981

50.337

512

50.072

50.120
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Table 3: Set up and memory requirements for 8-bit CME, AES, ECC and RC4
ECC

CME

AES

RC4

Time taken (ms):

359.5

80.13

409

258.5

Memory used (MB):

1.192

1.217

2.364

2.340

Table 4: Set up and memory requirements for 4-bit CME and VC
4-bit CME
0.448
21.44

Memory used (MB):
Time taken (ms):

VC
0.456
0

Table 5: Encryption/decryption time for AES, RC4 and 8-bit CME
Encryption (ms)
Data Size
(bits)
304
928
3024
4408
8144

Decryption (ms)

AES
0.199

Byte CME
0.031

RC4
0.014

0.17

0.142
0.173

0.059
0.136

0.027
0.023

0.185
0.148

0.173
0.262

0.02
0.024

AES

Byte CME
0.012

RC4
0.022

0.182
0.179

0.023
0.065

0.025
0.016

0.196
0.25

0.05
0.093

0.045
0.032

Table 6: Encryption/decryption times for 4-bit CME and VC schemes
Bit String
Length

Encryption (ms)
VC

16
32
64
128
256
512

0.056
0.08
0.196
0.368
0.868
2.822

4-bit CME
0.02
0.066
0.104
0.214
0.369
1.13

Decryption (ms)
VC
0.01
0.014
0.052
0.088
0.214
0.492

4-bit CME
0.02
0.036
0.06
0.074
0.136
0.328

CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Further research into alternative graphic methods is required to explore the applications of alternative systems such
as CME. The security offered by the proposed CME scheme makes it a potential candidate for post-quantum
cryptographic research. The system’s alternative key structure and non-singular mapping allow for resistance to a
large key space and superb avalanche effect, while maintaining competitive efficiency. These features require
further exploration. Comparative analysis between traditional and graphic-based ciphers is required to determine
whether alternative graphic methods are able to offer higher security for lower overheads. Optimization of these
schemes requires further research to ensure a lasting competitive advantage, and suitability for implementation in
application development. There is currently little standardisation in stream ciphers to replace RC4, and as such the
opportunity exists for an optimized version of CME to assist in this particular space in applications such as TLS that
utilize stream ciphers for encryption on a day-to-day basis.
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Abstract
Behaviour-based authorisation is a technique that assesses the user of a device for authenticity by comparing
their activities to previously established behaviour profiles. Passwords and other point of entry authorisation
techniques are often inadequate for protecting mobile device security as they only provide an initial barrier to
usage and do not operate continuously. Behaviour-based authorisation continuously assesses user authorisation,
using the device owner’s profile for authentication. This research improves upon behaviour-based authorisation
performance by applying a hybridised intrusion detection method. The constituent intrusion detection methods
that were applied include context-awareness and self-correction. Performance of a behaviour-based
authorisation method can be measured as either an increase in intrusion detection, without significantly
increasing false positives or a decrease in false positives without totally compromising intrusion detection. This
research found that an increase in performance can be achieved by the addition of intrusion detection
components.
Keywords
Behaviour-based authorisation, intrusion detection, context-awareness, self-correction, hybrid intrusion
detection, artificial neural network, mobile security

INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices facilitate a range of multimedia applications, many of which are driven by user data. This user
data has become sensitive in nature, including personal information, login credentials, and business data (Li,
Clarke, Papadaki, & Dowland, 2013). Mobile device theft rates have been recorded:



Approximately 1.6% of mobile phone owners experienced mobile phone theft in England and Wales
during 2012/2013 (Home-Office, 2014).
Collected US law enforcement data combined with FBI crime data indicates an estimate of 1/10th of all
theft for 2013 in the US is associated with the theft of a mobile device. According to a consumer
report’s survey, 3.1 million smartphone thefts occurred in 2013 (Federal-Communications-Commission,
2014; Tapellini, 2014).

Credent (cited by Li et al., 2013) found that 40% of participants in a survey failed to utilise personal
identification numbers (PIN). PIN-based approaches are also often misused when they are weak, rarely changed,
or shared with others. A fundamental weakness is that it does not seek to validate a user once they know the PIN
(Li et al., 2013).
Behaviour-based authorisation is a technique that assesses the user of a device for authenticity by comparing
their activities to previously established behaviour profiles. A benefit of behaviour-based authorisation is active
authentication wherein if an intruder somehow bypassed standard point of entry techniques, such as PINs or
passwords, they will still be under scrutiny (Li et al., 2013).
The research goal was to ascertain whether or not a combined intrusion detection method can be applied to
behaviour-based authorisation on mobile devices, with the purpose of performance improvement. The
performance improvement was measured by an increase in intrusion detection accuracy without significantly
increasing false positives or a reduction of false positives without totally compromising the intrusion detection
rate. Intrusion detection methods that were experimented with include contextual-awareness, adapting a system’s
assessment metrics based on the apparent situation, and self-correction, altering assessment results through
internal determination based on known information without additional external assistance.
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RESEARCH BACKGROUND
Approaches to Behavioural Profiling and Authorisation
Multiple approaches to behaviour profiling, including such approaches for the purpose of authorisation, have
been made. These approaches include different types of artificial neural networks, rule-based methods, specially
designed frameworks, and clustering methods.
Artificial Neural Networks
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are dynamic systems of interconnected parts. They are made up of artificial
neurons which each take in a set of inputs. Inputs are regulated by weight values and activation functions. A
training algorithm is applied to an ANN and the weights for all inputs are adjusted to improve the accuracy of
the output. ANNs are able to detect non-linear relationships and interactions among variables (Anandarajan,
2002; Wasserman, 1989b).
Li et al. (2013) experimented a radial basis function (RBF) ANN. The activation functions in an RBF ANN are
RBFs, which are used to determine the Euclidean distance of the inputs from certain points, known as centres.
Using this, the mapping relationship between the input and desired output can be obtained (Chang, Cheng, &
Yu-Feng, 2010; Li et al., 2013).
Li et al. (2013) also ran experiments with a feed-forward multi-layered perceptron (FF MLP) network. FF MLP
ANNs pass values in one direction, from input to output, typically using the sigmoid function or hyperbolic
tangent function as their activation function. The activation functions scale the outputs of each neuron which are
passed to further neurons in the network (Anandarajan, 2002; Li et al., 2013; Wasserman, 1989b).
A simple recurrent network (SRN) was experimented with by Anandarajan (2002) for the purpose of classifying
user behaviour in terms of workplace internet activity. An SRN has a small amount of additional neurons in the
input layer, known as context units that receive feedback signals from the hidden layers, allowing the ANN to
record the outputs of the hidden layers. This allows for past values to influence present values going into the
ANN meaning that the ANN can learn faster than a standard feed-forward ANN (Anandarajan, 2002; Krenker,
Kos, & Bešter, 2011).
It was found that ANN based systems, particularly RBF ANNs, would deliver a greater performance in terms of
correctly profiling user behaviour, at the cost of being more resource intensive, using twice the amount of
computational power of that of a rule-based method (Li et al., 2013).
Rule-Based and Fuzzy Systems
A dynamic rule-based approach was devised by Li et al. (2013) based on the idea that recent historical usage can
be used to predict the probability of a present event. As shown in Equation 1 the approach would provide a
mechanism to have all recorded outputs bounded between 0 and 1 to help determine a threshold. If a singular
output breaches the threshold, then the event is deemed to have breached the rule-set (Li et al., 2013).

Equation 1 Where: = the features of one chosen application,
values for

= the value of

= total number of features, t = predefined Threshold,
al., 2013).

,

= total number of

= feature occurrence (Li et

Sood, Mehmi, and Dogra (2015) conducted experimentation with a fuzzy system applying a user profiling
system for cloud computing. Fuzzy systems work by representing data in degrees rather than as booleans in a
linguistic way. Fuzzy systems are ideal for solutions where the problem is non-linear or hard to define. Fuzzy
logic is rule-based and determines what degree values are in relation to their variables. Variables that have had
their fuzzy values determined are weighted and aggregated to develop a crisp output (Sood et al., 2015).
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Rule-based methods appear to be able to distinguish user activity from different users through behaviour
profiling, but at a lesser rate of some machine learning methods as RBF ANNs (Li et al., 2013).
Other methods of user profiling
Majeed, Jing, Novakovic, and Ouazzane (2014) applied K-means clustering as a means to establish a user profile
with which to compare future user behaviour for legitimacy. K-means clustering is used to create a usage profile
from the input data gathered by a feature extractor. Once the usage profile is created the feature extractor
compares new user data to determine deviation. If a persistent deviation occurs, an alert is made (Majeed et al.,
2014).
Shi, Niu, Jakobsson, and Chow (2011) developed a machine learning framework based around modelling
independent features. The user model is developed as a combination of the probability density of all features,
based on time of occurrence. Selected features were based on good events, bad events and location. Good events
would be those conducted with known contacts, bad events are those with unknown contacts. When in training,
frequency and time between certain events would be used to establish feature probability. Using the Gaussian
mixture model (GMM) the probability of user being at a certain location at a certain time would also be
calculated (Shi et al., 2011).
The research conducted by Shi et al. (2011) provide a set of concise features that behaviour-based authorisation
can be tested on, including calls made, texts made, internet activity, and user location (Shi et al., 2011).
Of the methods of behaviour-based profiling and authorisation, ANNs and rule-based methods appear to produce
effective results, being able to identify most intrusive activity records during various experiments. However, the
problem of false positives remains among these methods. Work done by Li, Wheeler, and Clarke (2014) based
on that from Li et al. (2013) found that while illegitimate users were denied application access 95.83% of the
time, their developed framework allowed legitimate users access only 87.09% of time (Li et al., 2014).
Intrusion detection methods for reducing false positives
False positive reduction is important to intrusion detection as false positives make it more difficult to identify
intrusive activity and can cause resource intensive false alarms that discourage the use of the intrusion detection
system altogether.
Cluster-based Intrusion Detection Methods
Yassin, Udzir, Muda, and Sulaiman (2013) used K-means clustering and Naïve Bayes classification methods
combined to minimise false alarms generated by anomaly-based intrusions detection systems. K-means
clustering is used to separate activity data, normal or intrusive, into separately identifiable partitions. Naïve
Bayes Classification uses a set of attributes assigned to a set of classes and calculates the probability of activity
belonging to one class (normal activity) to another (intrusive activity) by assessing the occurrence of attributes
with the given activity. The combination of K-means clustering and Naïve Bayes classification performed
greater, in terms of reducing false positives, than either of the two methods standalone, demonstrating the
advantages of hybrid approaches (Yassin et al., 2013).
Hybrid frequency and relation-based Intrusion Detection Methods
Spathoulas and Katsikas (2010) discuss and experiment with a system with three components:


Neighbouring Related Alerts (NRA)



High Alert Frequency (HAF)



Usual False positives (UFP)

The NRA method relies on the assumption that most attacks have a group of alerts related to it. NRA works by
counting the amount of neighbours that exist in a time window, that have the same source and destination
addresses (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010).
HAF is based on how often an alert with a certain signature appears within a certain time window. Each existing
signature is given an average frequency which establishes the general distribution of signatures. After that, every
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time a signature occurs, the minimum amount of time for reoccurrence is established. If reoccurrence of a
signature appears before it should several times it will cause an alert (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010).
UFP is designed based on the idea that patterns of common false positives are related to topology problems or
misconfigured services. The frequency for the signature during an attack-free period is made. During actual
deployment, if a number of common frequencies occur more than expected, it may be a true positive and an alert
is made if an established limit is breached.
Each component acts independently to one another before combining their individual verdicts on whether or not
a given alert is true. This allows for the strengths and weaknesses of each component to complement and
mitigate each other (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010).
System security status level
Part of the research conducted by Li et al. (2013) involved the development of a framework that could facilitate
behaviour-based authorisation. The framework was developed to take into account different error rates
experienced by different sets of application usage data. A System security status (SSS) level is kept between -3
and +3 where -3 is low security and +3 is high security. SSS level is determined by the performance of a given
application based on equal error rate (EER) and the verification result, which can be a pass or fail. A verification
test is when user behaviour is matched to what is expected. If the verification is successful, it is added to the SSS
level. If verification fails, it is subtracted. The SSS also decreases over time through lack of usage. The SSS
framework allows for a given base behaviour-based authorisation method to produce initially incorrect results
but for corrections to be made if necessary based on further results (Li et al., 2013).

CHOSEN BEHAVIOUR-BASED AUTHORISATION METHOD
Artificial Neural Network
The behaviour-based authorisation method chosen as a baseline for this research was an ANN. The ANN was
built using pybrain, a python module that allows customisable ANNs to be built and applied to datasets. The
ANN was built with a configuration of four inputs, one output neuron and a variable amount of hidden neurons.
The input values were the day of the week for a given activity record, the time of the day for a given activity
record, the type of activity recorded and the details of the activity record. The output of the ANN would be a
single number, where the closer to one the value was, the more likely the record would be that of a legitimate
user.

h1

h2

Day of Record

h3

Time of Record

Output Value
h4
Output Layer with
1 Output Neuron

Type of Record

...

Record Details
Input Layer with
4 Inputs

hn
Hidden Layer with n
Hidden Neurons

Figure 1 ANN configuration for Behaviour-Based Authorisation Diagram, the number of hidden neurons (n) is a
configurable amount that had been experimented on.
The ANN configuration in Figure 1 receives four input values in the input layer and produces one output. The
output value is a number that is tested by examining whether or not it comes between an established pair of
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threshold values. If the output value falls outside the threshold values, it is designated as an intrusion, if it falls
between the threshold values it is designated as legitimate activity. The ANN was trained using the supervised
method of backwards propagation, as provided by the pybrain module (Wasserman, 1989a). Only legitimate user
behaviour could be used to train the ANN as intrusive behaviour would be unknown.
Chosen Behavioural Attributes
Partly based on the research conducted by Shi et al. (2011), for this experiment the following mobile device
attributes were used as independent/control variables to measure accuracy of the improved behaviour based
authorisation method:


calls made to known contacts



calls made to unknown contacts



text messages sent to known contacts



texts messages sent to unknown contacts



packet data sent to and from the device



location of the mobile device



day of the week and time of day activity occurs

INTRUSION DETECTION COMPONENTS
Self-correction using surrounding data
Self-correction provides a form of improvement that doesn’t require user intervention (Patel et al., 2011).
Because self-correction must be conducted without external intervention, it must be able to determine a
correction only using internal factors (Schmeck, Müller-Schloer, Çakar, Mnif, & Richter, 2010; Yang et al.,
2013). Surrounding data describes the records that occur before and after a given timeline record. Using
surrounding data, a given record can be reassessed and potentially corrected if required. This works by assessing
the surrounding data of a record. If a certain amount of the surrounding data records are assessed as intrusive,
then it is concluded that the surrounded record is also intrusive. If a certain amount of the surrounding data
records are not intrusive, the surrounded record will be determined to be a legitimate record.
For example, where o = 2 and t = 1
Record n-o

Record n-2 I

...

Record n-1 L

Record n-2
Record n-1

Record n

Record n+1

If the occurrence of I is
greater than the tolerance (t),
record n is then determined
as I
However, if the occurrence of
I is less than or equal to t,
record n is determined as L

Record n

Determined as I

Record n+2 L
For example, where o = 2 and t = 1
Record n-2 L

Record n+o

Record n-1 L

o = Outreach, where outreach is the
amount of surrounding data records
assessed on either side of a given
examined record (record n)

Two surrounding records had
been determined as Intrusive
by the ANN’s initial
assessment, therefore Record
n is determined to be
Intrusive

Record n+1 I

...

Record n+2

Each record had been
assessed via ANN as either
intrusive (I) or legitimate (L)

Record n Determined as L

Only one surrounding record
had been determined as
intrusive by the ANN, which
is equal to the tolerance,
therefore Record n is
determined to be legitimate

Record n+1 I
Record n+2 L
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Figure 2 Diagram describing self-correction via surrounding data records
The self-correction process works by examining records that occur before and after a current record, based on a
configurable outreach, and adjusts an initial assessment of a record, whether it is intrusive or legitimate, by
examining the initial assessments of the surrounding records. If the numbers of records surrounding the
examined record, within the given outreach, that is different to the examined record exceed a threshold value,
which is also configurable, the examined record is changed to match the different records.
Adjusting self-correction through context awareness
Different conditions that include erratic user behaviour, overtrained ANNs or less distinguishable intruders
require different approaches to mitigate (Piotrowski & Napiorkowski, 2013; Tetko, Livingstone, & Luik, 1995).
A dynamic approach that can apply changes to assessment when required will allow a given problem to be
mitigated without causing another problem.
Context awareness was applied to self-correction to allow for the tolerance of potential false assessments to be
adjusted. If false positives occur frequently, tolerance was increased so that false positives that would otherwise
remain incorrect can be changed. In the same way that false positives can be accounted for, false negatives that
would evade the self-correction process can be caught by adjusting the tolerance to be lower. The contextawareness component adjusts tolerance whenever a false positive or false negative was identified and corrected
using self-correction. Whenever a record was not identified as false, the tolerance was changed to be closer to
the default.

Record n to
change?

Record n

No

Yes

Is dt greater than
or less than t?
Is t greater
than 1?

Yes

Decrease t

I

Is t less
than o-1?

Yes

Increase t

Intrusive or
Legitimate?

L

Greater

Increase t

Less

Decrease t

Record n = Record being assessed by self-correction
t = Tolerance values that determines is Record n needs to change
dt = Default tolerance values
o = Outreach of self-correction
When an increase of decrease occurs, if does so by a value of 1
Whether the record is determined as intrusive or legitimate depends on the
assessment of the self-correction component, which is influenced by t

Figure 3 Flowchart of the context-aware component working with the self-correction component
The context-aware component adjusts the threshold of the self-correction component to be either more restrictive
when false negative has recently been detected and changed or less restrictive when a false positive has recently
been detected and changed. If no changes had been made due to caught false positives or false negatives, the
context-aware component either does nothing or changes to be closer to the default self-correction threshold.
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Previous and
following ANN
assessment results

Record n

ANN assessment

Situational
tolerance
adjustment

Self-correction
adjustment

Assessment Result

Figure 4 Overview of a record being processed through ANN combined with both intrusion detection
components.
The overall process, as described by Figure 4, examines each record which are assessed by the ANN, previous
and following assessments are also retrieved. The self-correction component adjusts the assessment of the ANN
based on the previous and following record assessment, the ANN’s assessment and the threshold adjustment
made by the context-aware component. The self-correction component sends the result to the context-aware
component which, based on the situation, will make a tolerance threshold adjustment to the self-correction
component for the next record. The result from the self-correction component is also the final result for the
record.

EXPERIMENT RESULTS
To test the capabilities of the applied intrusion detection methods of improving behaviour-based authorisation
performance, three systems were developed. The base ANN (treatment script 1) served as the baseline for
experimentation and the ANN with a self-correction component and context-awareness (treatment script 3)
component served as the end-line. The base ANN with only the self-correction component was also assessed
(treatment script 2). Each system was tested on 14 user pair datasets, where each pair consisted of training data
from a legitimate user, test data from a legitimate user and test data from an intrusive user. Data for these 14
datasets was produced from the MIT reality mining dataset (Eagle & Pentland, 2006).The mean overall
accuracies, false positive rates and true positives rates for each system applied to each dataset were examined.
The overall accuracy of a behaviour-based authorisation method depends on the rate that it can determine
intrusive activity, as well as the rate that it produces false positives from legitimate activity. Overall accuracy did
not always increase, but did for four of the 14 datasets demonstrating its capability to do so. Examining the
mean result for all datasets together found that the overall accuracy did increase but not significantly.
False positives are legitimate activities mistaken for intrusive activities. Overall, the mean false positive rate was
reduced when the intrusion detection components were applied. With the exception of two datasets, the
behaviour-based authorisation method with intrusion detection concepts applied was able decrease false
positives to below 5%.
True positives are intrusive activities correctly identified as intrusive. Overall the mean true positives rate was
found to be less when both intrusion detection concepts had been applied. The self-correction component
significantly increased the true positive rate, but this was always reduced with the application context-awareness.
It was also found that if the base ANN had a true positive below 10%, the behaviour-based authorisation method
with both intrusion detection concepts would perform at a rate below 5%, in most cases 0%.
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Figure 5 Bar chart of different mean overall accuracies separated by Dataset and Treatment Script, with
datasets 1 through to 14 being plotted across treatment scripts 1, 2 and 3.

Figure 6 Bar chart of different mean false positive rates separated by Dataset and Treatment Script, with
datasets 1 through to 14 being plotted across treatment scripts 1, 2 and 3.
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Figure 7 Bar chart of different mean true positive rates separated by Dataset and Treatment Script, with
datasets 1 through to 14 being plotted across treatment scripts 1, 2 and 3

CONCLUSION
This research involved the development of modular components based on intrusion detection methods to find out
whether or not said intrusion detection methods can improve the performance of behaviour-based authorisation
on mobile devices. The intrusion detection methods were based around:


Self-correction



Context awareness



Hybridisation

The results of experimentation found that the performance of a behaviour-based authorisation method for mobile
devices can be improved by applying a hybrid self-correction and context-aware intrusion detection component,
but only if the initial base behaviour-based authorisation method can detect intrusions at a rate of at least 10%.
The self-correction intrusion detection component, when added, improved intrusion detection rates but increased
the rate of false alarms. The hybrid self-correction and context-aware components, when applied, reduced false
alarms to an average rate of below 5%, many producing a rate of 0%. However, the hybrid self-correction and
context-aware components also reduced true positive (intrusion detection) rates for most datasets. Although the
false positive reduction indicates an increase in performance, if the intrusion detection rate falls to 0, the
performance of a behaviour-based authorisation method is also effectively 0. The experiments found that if the
base behaviour-based authorisation method’s intrusion detection rate was at least 10%, the intrusion detection
rate would not fall to 0 when the hybrid self-correction and context-aware components are applied.
A reduction in false positives indicates an improvement of performance for a behaviour-based authorisation
method, as it maintains the accessibility of a device while potentially preventing breaches of privacy and
integrity. However if the ability to detect intrusions does not exist, the performance of a behaviour-based
authorisation method also does not exist, regardless of lower false positive rates. As an improvement to the
performance of the behaviour-based authorisation method only appears to occur when the initial method has an
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intrusion detection rate of 10% or higher, future research should focus on experimenting with other behaviourbased authorisation methods that are capable of fulfilling the requirements for improvement.
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Abstract
Throughout the past decade the methods employed by terrorist organisations have changed drastically. One of
these key changes has been associated with the rise of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and
blogging in general. Terrorist organisations appear to be using the wide reach and vast network capabilities
created by social media to disseminate propaganda, radicalise susceptible individuals, recruit potential fighters
and communicate strategic and operational objectives. However, this growing terrorist presence on Social
Media can also offer invaluable insights into the social networks of terrorist organisations through the use of
Social Media Mining and Social Network Analysis. By coupling these two techniques together, researchers can
gain a greater understanding of how to combat and possibly destabilise complex terrorist social networks and
aid in the fight against radicalisation and terrorism.
Keywords
Terrorism, National Security, Social Network Services, Social Groups, Social Network Analysis, Social Media

INTRODUCTION
Throughout the past decade the nature of terrorism has changed enormously. Through the changing global
economy, to the universal issues facing all nations today such as climate change, the face of terrorism is a very
different, and as many would observe, a more frightening one. While the core of terrorism may be tenacious in
its changeability, with political, religious and ideological violence still the most common claims to terrorist
action, arguably the biggest change has come from Social Media. Social Media has opened up new ways for
radical thinkers to communicate, network, plan and operate. Social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, Myspace, and Blogging sites in general, have fundamentally and irrevocably changed the platform for
terrorist networking in the 21st century. While social media has opened up extraordinary avenues for socialising,
sharing information, rallying for political and social causes, and identity formation, it has also made combatting
terrorism exponentially more difficult due to the sheer magnitude of data exchanged and retained .
With
a
change in the medium of terrorist networking and organisation, so too must there be a change in the way we
investigate, understand and counter terrorist networks – and Social Network Analysis (SNA) coupled with Social
Media itself, may have the answer. This paper will explore how SNA can be used to analyse data collected
through Social Media Mining to help map out and analyse terrorist networks. This coupling can be immensely
helpful for future researchers studying terrorist networks, as well as law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Social network analysis and terrorism
Social Network Analysis was developed in the 1950’s as a methodology for investigating relations between
actors. Where traditional social science methods focused predominantly on the individual as the primary source
of social data, SNA re-directed the focus on the relations between the actors rather than on the actors themselves
(Knoke & Yang, 2008). By doing this, SNA practitioners could observe the nuanced dynamics between
individuals, groups, corporations, nation-states, etc. often providing a rich source of meaningful information not
obtainable through traditional social science research methods. SNA was then quickly adopted in many different
disciplines including: criminology, where it was/is used to map criminal organisation structure and analyse the
power dynamics, distribution and crime patterns of its key players. Anthropology, where tribal, urban and
informal groups are mapped to aid in understanding the formal and informal social structures. And the health
sciences, where diseases such as Avian flu and HIV/AIDS can be geographically mapped and better prevented
through the focus on interactions between infected individuals. With the many benefits of SNA presenting
themselves in various disciplines, recently, scholars have begun unleashing SNA’s unique analytic capabilities
on the study of terrorism, and more specifically, terrorist networks (these scholars’ works will be explored later).
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As Perliger and Pedahuzer (2011) note students appear to be reluctant in using SNA as “the majority of political
violence students have very limited acquaintance with the rationale, main concepts, and methodological tools of
SNA… and consequently tend to express doubt in regard to its efficiency and relevance for the study of complex
social phenomena” (Perliger and Pedahuzer, 2011, pp:45). This unfortunate point leads to an oversight in the
important, rich and meaningful results, that can be obtained in terrorism studies through the use of SNA. SNA is
a research tool that is rarely included as part of the curriculum in social science departments at universities, with
most students not even hearing about it well into their post-graduate studies. With the advances in technology,
specifically the personal computer, there was a sharp ascent in SNA popularity which was the direct result of the
development of SNA software, most notably UCINET, Pajek, NetMiner, STRUCTURE and MultiNet (Knoke &
Yang, 2008). However, SNA remained a relatively nuanced research methodology within Terrorism and
Security Studies, not often practiced by scholars. Having said this, there has been a small group of academics
who have completed research in terrorism studies using SNA methodologies.
Scholar Karl Van Meter, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City used SNA, specifically Link
Analysis to describe various forms of network research including adversary networks and traffic analysis in
relation to phone surveillance. Van Meter’s study examined this topic by focusing on the US Army from World
War II to the late 1960s, against the IRA in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and well into the modern era (VanMeter, 2001). By using SNA in the study of terrorism, Van Meter was able to identify weaknesses in certain
terrorist networks which would otherwise not have been uncovered through traditional social science
approaches. Going one step further, Kathleen Carley specifically targeted her research at destabilising covert
networks. Through SNA networks she was able to identify weaknesses in the social networks and accurately
develop strategies to combat and destabilise them (Carley, 2006). Similar to Carley (2006), Krebs (2002) points
out the difficulty in mapping covert terrorist cells and offers insights into how SNA can be used in future
research for this purpose (Krebs, 2002). However, as Perliger and Pedahuzer note, “even though their [post
September 11 SNA scholars] studies showed strong potential in providing significant insights into the structures
and internal processes of terrorist groups, the use of SNA in the study of political violence has remained quite
limited and still amounts to only a small fraction of the research in the field” (Perliger & Pedahzur, 2011). One
of the reasons scholars of Terrorism and Security studies have not been inclined to use SNA techniques is due to
the assumption that Social Network Analysis is often hindered by difficulties in data collection. However, the
rise of social media may be a solution to this problem.
Social Media as a Data Source for SNA
The use of Social Media as a data source in SNA has been growing over the last decade, since the rise of Social
Media in general. The data is often gathered through data mining, using software specifically designed to
pinpoint keywords, to more laborious methods, such as manually scouring hashtags, as in the case of twitter.
However, with the large number of individuals participating in social media, creating, engaging with and
disseminating networks, social media makes an excellent source for SNA data collection.
Data collection methods vary from site to site; however common approaches can be identified. Sites such as
Twitter and Instagram allow data to be collected directly from the application programming interface (API), such
as the method used by Community Studies scholars Wayne Williamson and Kristian Ruming (Williamson &
Ruming, 2016). Data collection through the API is also possible for the social network site Facebook, however
recent important changes to the privacy permissions of the application have barred access to specific data such as
the sharing of ‘Friend’s’ information. However, core data sets are still accessible within the Facebook API,
allowing the researcher access to useful network data Networks can also be traced and linked through hashtags,
a type of metadata label which works similarly to a hyperlink but with a broader focus on social interaction
(Chang & Iyer, 2012). Blogging works similarly in that social interaction and ‘sharing’ are key to the function of
the site, allowing a data collector or researcher access to already established digital networks. Scholars have
taken advantage of these large amounts of accessible data for research in varying disciplines such as Community
Studies, Political Science, Psychology and Pedagogy. See (Norman, Nordin, Din, Ally, & Dogan, 2015), (Fu,
Cheng, Wong, & Yip, 2013), (Williamson & Ruming, 2016) and (Lucente & Wilson, 2013). Having said this
there has been little use of Social Media data combined with SNA techniques in the study of terrorism.
While data collected through social media has been used in terrorism studies, it has rarely been integrated and
analysed through SNA. It is well documented that terrorist propaganda, social networks and recruitment
processes are disseminated through social media. However, the overwhelming majority of literature featuring the
key words “Social Media” and “Terrorism” is concerned with the use of social media by terrorist organisations,
rather than using social media as a data gathering tool to aid in the understanding and combat of terrorism. See
(Dean, Bell, & Newman, 2012), (Marhu & Balteanu, 2014) and (Markon, 2016). Many academics, including the
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above authors have documented the use of social media by terrorist organisations and how this creates a risk of
online radicalisation to susceptible individuals. They also address the international network potential of terrorist
groups and organisational prowess made possible by social media. However, as mentioned above there appears
to be very little research that takes advantage of the relatively large radical and terrorist presence on social media
as a data source for combatting terrorism and extremism.
This paper identifies 3 key advantages of using Social Media data with SNA in terrorism studies
1. International terrorist networks are easier to link together: While other methods of research into terrorist
networks may be somewhat effective at identifying primitive links between key actors, they are rarely
useful in mapping international connectedness.
2. The majority of Social Media data is open-source: Due to the covert and confidential nature of
terrorism, data collection is often limited to news reports and declassified government documents,
which are often outdated and no longer relevant. Social Media data, for the most part, is open to any
individual with the abilities to mine it. This coupled with the large use of Social Media by terrorist
organisations exposes a gold-mine of terrorist network data
3. Social Media Mining circumvents the risks of field research: Due to the violent nature of terrorist
groups, ethnographic field research often comes with great risks to the researcher’s well-being. While
this method of research offers extensive and important ethnographic data, it is often very dangerous and
thus rarely undertaken. Social Network data mining and SNA can be completed externally, with extra
protection possibilities provided through secure servers and networks. This method of research
eliminates the dangers experienced by the field researcher and allows for more varied and automated
data gathering techniques.
With this in mind, it is also important to outline the disadvantages of using Social Media data with SNA in
terrorism studies. SNA being a quantitative research methodology misses out on the detailed subject centred
approach that qualitative studies offer. Ethnographic studies for example while limited in their scope, offer a
much more detailed analysis of the human experience involved in terrorism. The other key disadvantage evident
is the fact that not all terrorist organisations use social media. This can lead to a gap in data, which can cause
misleading analyses. Having said this, specific research methods should not be used in isolation. SNA and Social
Media Mining should be used as a complimentary research approach. Combining qualitative and quantitative
research methods can lead to a more rounded approach to studying terrorism, therefore the disadvantages of
SNA and Social Media Mining should not be seen as a problem when appropriately complimented.
These above mentioned three key advantages of coupling Social Media Mining with SNA as a research
methodology position the researcher at a key advantage to others in the field of terrorism studies.

IMPLICATIONS
Data gathered from social media sites and applications can be integrated in SNA to produce insightful analyses
into various aspects of extremism and terrorism. This coupling can provide invaluable insights into the network,
power relations, distribution patterns and radicalisation trends of terrorist networks. Additionally, the advantages
are not limited to analysis and understanding, they also offer integral practical applications. Through
understanding the structure and most importantly, the key relations within terrorist social networks, researchers
and security agencies will be able to effectively identify vulnerabilities in the network, which could ultimately
expose opportunities to destabilise networks as a counter-offensive tactic. Thus, the use of Social Media data in
SNA can be employed in counter-terrorism as well. Several variables must be addressed during the planning and
operational stage of such research; therefore, this paper will not publish such results here. However, this paper
hopefully exposes important and useful techniques in understanding terrorist networks for future research to
explore, allowing for a more in depth discussion on the analytical capabilities of the coupling of SNA with social
media mining.

CONCLUSION
The analytic capabilities of SNA in Terrorism Studies are invaluable, however there is a peculiar lack of research
done using SNA techniques. This appears to come down to a lack of in-depth conceptual understanding of the
methodology. However, by combining the data mining resources of Social Media, a domain which is populated
by many terrorist organisations, with the relation focused analytic capabilities of Social Network Analysis, we
may be able to better understand and ultimately combat terrorist networks which threaten national and global
security. This article offers only a brief outline of the capabilities of the proposed research method, but hopefully
illuminates possible approaches to terrorism that may be adopted by future researchers as well as law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.
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Abstract
Electronic transfer of prescriptions is an essential element of electronic medications management. Unfortunately,
current manual and preliminary electronic transfer of prescription methods are not patient focussed, leading to a
suboptimal solution for the patient. This is increasingly relevant in the push for more patient engagement in their
own healthcare. The area is highly controlled by legislation and regulation. Through research and an analysis of
the possible methods to improve and personalise electronic transfer of prescriptions, this paper provides an
overview of these conclusions, and presents an alternative technical solution. The solution has been derived from
a number of experiments in data transfer techniques using a mobile phone. The paper explains how this meets the
current regulations and legislation, as well as providing a patient centred approach to the problem. Ultimately,
healthcare outcomes will improve where patients are given the opportunity and the tools to better engage in their
own healthcare management, and secure electronic transfer of prescriptions with patient access to their own
medication lists may improve compliance and reduce healthcare costs.
Keywords
ePrescription transfer, ePrescription security, mobile transfer of ePrescription, eTP, mobile eTP

INTRODUCTION
The use of electronic prescription (eTP) is the lifeblood of eHealth and in improving quality of care through
better medication compliance, improved prescribing accuracy and efficiency while reducing the adverse drug
events. In fact, electronic prescribing is an essential initial step of the electronic Medication Management (eMM)
program which primarily focuses on improving medication-related outcomes through better quality and
availability of medications-related healthcare information (“NEHTA Blueprint V2”, 2011). Having an effective
medication management system in place improves medication compliance and reduces adverse drug events. A
recent study indicates almost 70,000 hospital admissions per year are associated with adverse drug events and
poor medication compliance/adherence. This significantly contributes to having undesirable patient outcomes
such as hospital readmission or even loss of life (White, 2015). The use of eTP enables eMM to reduce these
undesirable outcomes and to prevent excessive use of healthcare expenditure while providing better patient
safety.
Current eTP implementation converts the conventional manual prescription process/model to a digital equivalent
using two Prescription Exchange Services (PES), Script Exchange from eRx and Script Vault from MediSecure
(Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015a). Using these PES services, prescribers can upload the electronic copy of
the prescription for later download and dispense by the pharmacies. The use of electronic prescription exchange
not only connects the two major healthcare providers such as clinicians and pharmacists, but it also paves the
way to create a national medication repository. Such a repository would allow clinicians, pharmacists, aged care
facilities and hospitals to see a combined list of prescribed and dispensed medications regardless of how many
different doctors and pharmacies the patient has visited. However, current implementation of eTP is an
expensive operation to maintain as an ongoing process for the nation. The associated electronic prescription fees
for each prescription downloaded from PES used to be as much as AU$ 0.85 prior to achieving the
interoperability between the two PES services. Some negotiations and cooperation between the Commonwealth,
the Pharmacy Guild and the two PES operators managed to reduce the electronic prescription fees to AU$ 0.15
per eligible prescription. This electronic prescription fees has, so far, been subsidised by the Commonwealth
through a series of Community Pharmacy Agreements (CPA). However, the section 6.1.3 and Appendix-B of the
current agreement, Sixth Community Pharmacy Agreement (6CPA), states that funding from 1st July 2016 and
onwards will be subject to a cost-effectiveness assessment by an independent health technology assessment body
as determined by the Minister ("The Pharmacy Guild of Australia", 2015). Since the eligibility criteria for this
subsidy can be tightened or amended to the disadvantages of the pharmacies (i.e. current eTP implementation
being a pharmacy user-pay system) ("FAQs", 2016), exploration of cheaper alternatives with comparable
security measures to the current use of eTP is commendable.
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WHAT ETP STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS MANDATES VS CURRENT
ETPIMPLEMENTATION
There are numerous standards and mandates regulating the management of medications in Australia. These
include the Electronic Transaction Act (ETA) and various Acts and Regulations governing the Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods. They have been repealed and/or amended at the Commonwealth as well as State and
Territory level to accommodate the implementation of eTP in Australian healthcare. Figure 1 briefly depicts how
these Acts and Regulations fit together to enable the current eTP implementation. It also demonstrates how the
legislation and regulations in Australia are constructed and the complexity of this construction for eTP. The
outermost circle represents the encompassing regulation for the entire nation. The next inner circle defines the
regulations for each State and Territory amended as per jurisdictional legislative requirements. These two circles
enable the use of electronic transactions at national, state and territory levels thus making the use of eTP and
other electronic transactions possible. The third circle lists Acts and Regulations governing the Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods for each jurisdiction which play a major role in enabling the use of eTP. The centre circle
contains various standards and specifications developed reflecting those national and jurisdictional legislative
requirements. It is named Dante’s 4 circles of eTP as the closer the circle is to the centre of the diagram the more
eTP specific it becomes in a similar way the 14th century poet Dante Alighieri’s depiction of nine circles of hell
(i.e. lower circles are for more severe sins).
(Commonwealth)
Electronic Transaction Act 1999

eTP related

Medicines, Poisons and Health (Drugs and
Therapeutic Goods Act Poisons) Regulation
2012 1996

Poision Act 1964
Poisons Regulation
1965

Implementation



ATS 4888.1 – 6 (2013)
AS 4700.3 (2014)

Poisons Act 1971
Poisons
Regulations 2008

Poisons and
Therapeutic
Goods Regulation
2008
Medicines, Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods
Act 2008
Medicines, Poisons
and Therapeutic
Goods Regulations
2008

Controlled
Drugs, Poisons and
Substances Act 1984
Controlled Substances
Controlled substances
Regulations 2006
(Poisons) Regulations
2011

eTP related

Electronic Transaction Act 1999
(Commonwealth)

Figure 1. Dante’s 4 circles of eTP
The Commonwealth Electronic Transaction Act 1999 facilitates the use of electronic means and enables the use
of electronic communications in dealings with government, business and community for the future economic and
social prosperity of Australia. Various States and Territories amend/adopt this overarching Act to suit their
jurisdictional legislative requirements. This jurisdictional ETA and various Acts and Regulations governing the
Poisons and Therapeutic Goods for each jurisdiction dictate the requirements for eTP implementation in that
jurisdiction. After all the eTP requirements of all jurisdictions have been considered, various standards and
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specifications have been developed reflecting those requirements. Among these related standards and
specifications, ATS4888 series and AS4700.3 primarily govern the implementation of eTP. Current eTP
implementation developed in compliance with these standards and specifications is briefly depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Current electronic prescription transfer model using PES (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015a)
Although ATS4888.2 of the ATS4888 series particularly emphasizes on the platform independent model, it also
includes specific details on securing electronic prescription information from the security of the data-at-rest
perspective. It mandates that the electronic prescription to be encrypted using a symmetric key derived from the
Document Access Key (DAK) before being stored on PES. DAK is the barcode printed on the paper prescription
created by any eTP enabled electronic prescribing system. The current eTP implementation also makes use of
DAK for authorizing access to the prescription stored on the PES and decrypting it after being downloaded from
PES. In addition, section 7.3.3 of the ATS4888.2 strictly prohibits storing of DAK or any of its derived key on
any stable storage (i.e. non-volatile storage) unless they have been encrypted using 128 bit encryption. Further
details on securing electronic prescription from the security of data-at-rest perspective can be found in sections
5.3.3 - 5.3.4, 5.3.6 - 5.3.7 and 7.3.3 of the ATS4888.2. These sections provide an overview of the security
mechanism implemented using the DAK for safeguarding prescription information. Figure 3 briefly illustrates
how this security mechanism works.

Figure 3: DAK usage for storage and retrieval of prescription with PES (Standards Australia, 2013, Figure 19)
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On the other hand, although ATS4888.2 contains specific details on securing prescription information from
security of data-at-rest perspective, it mentions very little on securing the prescription information from data-intransit (i.e. data in motion) perspective. Both sections 5.3.5 and 7.3.3 of ATS4888.2 mention that securing
prescription information from data-in-transit perspective entirely relies on the security and encryption
mechanism of the implementation platform and the eTP technical specification for that platform. Research on
eTP to date has not encountered any other standard or specification which includes further details on securing
prescription information from data-in-transit perspective. Security in this context appears to be solely relying on
existing industrial standards and best practices. Current implementation of eTP (i.e. both PES services)
implements the simple Subscriber-Provider pattern instead of publishing their service endpoints using Endpoint
Location Services (ELS) service infrastructure (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2016). Moreover, current eTP
implementation does not utilize other eHealth infrastructural components such as Health Identifiers (HI)
Services. Unfortunately, this leaves current eTP implementation considerable room for future improvement from
security perspective.
Another disadvantage of the current eTP is its associated ongoing cost, the electronic prescription fees. Although
the combined effort of the Commonwealth, the Pharmacy Guild and the two PES operators could reduce the fees
to AU$ 0.15 per eligible prescription, it is still a taxing expenditure for the nation on the long run. A recent
survey by eRx found that pharmacies using eRx are dispensing 753,000 electronic prescriptions per day with up
to 25 prescriptions per second during peak periods. When dispensing 753,000 prescriptions per day, it will cost
the nation AU$ 112,950 a day for electronic prescription fees alone.

Figure 4. Number of prescriptions over 10 year’s period

Figure 5. PBS expenditure over 10 year’s period
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Using statistics from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme website, figure 4 and 5 depicts the number of
prescriptions and PBS expenditure over the past 10 years. Based on figure 4 and 5, it is evident that although the
PBS expenditure fluctuate slightly, the number of prescriptions increased steadily over the decade.
Unfortunately, this indicates that unless less expensive alternatives are explored and utilized, the on-going
expense associated with the use of electronic prescription will only cost more in future with increase in volume.
At present, electronic prescription fees has been subsidised by the Commonwealth through a series of
Community Pharmacy Agreements. However, despite the fact that current eTP implementation being designed
as a pharmacy user-pay system ("FAQs", 2016), which party (among prescriber, dispenser and patient) will
actually be liable to pay for this on-going cost when it is no longer subsidised by the Commonwealth and the
ramification of this potential change is yet to be witnessed.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE MOBILE SOLUTION
The proposed mobile electronic prescription transfer application was designed to be a cheaper, if not completely
cost-free, alternative with comparable security measures to the current eTP implementation using PES. This
proposed solution makes use of the patient’s smartphone as the secured transfer mechanism for transferring
electronic prescription instead of using PES. Figure 6 roughly depicts how this model works and its simplified
operations using the patient’s smartphone in place of PES services whilst the rest of the operations remain the
same as in the current eTP system.

Figure 6: Electronic prescription transfer model using smartphones (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015a)
In securing the prescription information from the security of data-at-rest perspective, this model also makes use
of DAK for encrypting the electronic prescription prior to transfer (i.e. to the patient’s mobile device) and
decrypting at the pharmacy end. However, in this model, the prescriber’s Electronic Prescribing System (EPS)
also transfers the DAK together with the electronic prescription to the patient’s smartphone for storage and
transportation instead of using PES. The DAK is then encrypted using a 128 bit symmetric encryption, in
compliance with the section 7.3.3 of the ATS4888.2, by the mobile electronic prescription transfer application
prior to being stored on the smartphone. Upon arriving at the pharmacy, the mobile electronic prescription
transfer application on the smartphone decrypts the DAK and transfers it together with the electronic
prescription to the pharmacy’s eTP enabled Electronic Dispensing System (EDS). This transfer is to be done via
Bluetooth communication although earlier research was conducted with the intention of using NFC technology
instead. Once both the DAK and electronic prescription have been transferred to the pharmacy’s EDS system,
the rest of the eTP operations such as decrypting the prescription using DAK, dispensing the medication and
updating the National Prescriptions and Dispense Repository (NPDR) will continue in the same way as if in the
current eTP implementation (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015b). For the repeat prescription scenario, the
pharmacy’s EDS will update the prescription information on the smartphone via the mobile electronic
prescription transfer application. This model is designed to have minimal impact on the prescriber’s EPS and
dispenser’s EDS systems in straightforward operations (i.e. simple prescribe and dispense scenario with no
script-owing or script-request). How this proposed model’s security mechanism works and how it differs from
the one using PES can be seen in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: DAK usage for storage and retrieval of prescription in proposed approach (Htat, Williams, &
McCauley, 2015b)
Since the prescription information is stored on the patient’s smartphone, despite both the DAK and the electronic
prescription being securely encrypted, it is still vulnerable to loss due to loss of the device on which it is stored.
To ensure this sensitive information does not fall into the wrong hand, the remote data-wipe feature can be
implemented as part of the mobile electronic prescription transfer application using Cloud-to-Device-Messaging
(C2DM) from Google on Android platform, Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) on iOS platform and Windows
Push Notification Services (WNS) on Windows phone platform. This will enable the device owner to remotely
delete the prescription data stored on the device. Currently all major mobile OS platforms such as Android, iOS
and Windows support remote wipe features for scenario like this.
From the security of the data-in-transit perspective, this proposed model relies on the Bluetooth’s inbuilt security
measures and governing standards for securing the prescription information in a very similar way current PES
implementation relies on the implementation platform and its relevant standards for the security of the data in
transit (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015b).

DISCUSSION
The primary objective of the proposed mobile solution is to provide a cheaper, if not completely cost-free,
alternative with comparable security measures. Therefore, the proposed alternative mobile solution intends to
achieve the same level of security assurance as the current eTP implementation using PES by fulfilling the same
security requirements mandated by the same standards and specifications.
Being a national eHealth facility, current implementation of eTP using PES is considered to have complied with
the legislative requirements of all the jurisdictions within Australia. However, the study on how it complies with
those requirements and to which extent it complies with those requirements leads to interesting findings. For
instance, whilst sections 32A, 32B and Appendix-K of the Western Australia’s Poisons Regulation 1965
describes the fairly detailed criteria of an approved electronic prescribing system by CEO, the clause "in a
manner of writing approved by the Secretary." in section 26 (1) (b) of the Victoria's Drugs, Poisons and
Controlled Substances Regulations 2006 implies the use of electronic prescribing without further details on it.
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Moreover, whilst the sections 37 (1A) (1B) and 51 (1A) (1B) (1C) of the Western Australia’s Poisons
Regulation 1965 explicitly state the exemption from the requirement of prescriber’s signature on electronic
prescriptions, sections 33 (5) and 34 (3) of the South Australia’s Controlled Substances (Poisons) Regulations
2011 only mention that prescribers with adequate arrangements for the electronic transmission of prescriptions
are permitted to transmit prescriptions electronically and it will be deemed to have been signed. Whilst one Act
or regulation dictates something explicitly, the others imply the same meaning using somewhat catch-all
statements and vice versa. Therefore, from the legislative approval/acceptance perspective, it is expected that the
proposed mobile solution will be accepted as a viable alternative if it complies with all the same standards and
specifications as the current eTP using PES.
From the security of the data-at-rest perspective, the proposed solution also makes use of the symmetric
encryption key derived from the DAK for securing the electronic prescription in the same way current eTP
implementation using PES services does. This limits the impact of the change in transfer mechanism (i.e.
patient’s smartphone instead PES) on other components of the eTP process such as prescribing, dispensing and
updating NPDR etc. Then, in the proposed solution, the DAK is encrypted using a 128 bit symmetric encryption
according to section 7.3.3 (i.e. Data Security Conformance Points) of the ATS4888.2 before being stored on the
mobile device (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015b). Since the proposed solution uses the same DAK for
securing the electronic prescription and the DAK itself is stored encrypted according to the relevant security
mandates, the proposed solution’s security measures are so far comparable to those of the current approach using
PES. Moreover, in the same way the DAK scanned from the paper prescription is used for authorizing the
pharmacy access to the prescription stored on the PES in the current eTP implementation, the DAK transferred
from the mobile electronic prescription transfer application (i.e. the application from patient smartphone to the
pharmacy’s EDS) authorizes the pharmacy to access the electronic prescription stored on the patient’s
smartphone. Therefore, this authorisation mechanism of the proposed solution is also comparable to the current
one being used.
From the security of the data-in-transit perspective, the Bluetooth’s inbuilt security measures and governing
standards upon which this proposed model depends on for securing the prescription information are well
accepted by the industry and strictly governed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) and IEEE standard
802.15.1-2005. With strict governance by these two reputable authority bodies (i.e. Bluetooth SIG and IEEE),
the implementation platform specific security measures of the proposed model (i.e. using Bluetooth) can be
considered comparable to those of the current eTP implementation using the Internet.
Current eTP implementation using PES does not use any of the existing eHealth infrastructural components such
as SMD, ELS and HI services although they can be effectively incorporated for better security, identification
mechanism, consistency and reliability. Since the current approach using PES does not set very high standards
for the proposed prescription transfer approach to live up to, this makes the proposed solution easier to
implement and more acceptable to the industry. Although the primary objective of the proposed solution is to be
a cheaper alternative with comparable security measures to the current approach using PES, it also has a few
additional advantages over the current approach. First, this proposed solution puts the user in control of their
sensitive information and allows them to prevent undesirable secondary use of that information by third parties.
In addition, some useful features such as prescription expiration alert, last repeat alert, drug allergy alert and alert
for harmful doses can also be implemented as part of the mobile electronic prescription transfer application. The
ability to transfer the full history of patient’s medication from the patient’s mobile phone directly into the
hospital system (i.e. once the interface has been implemented to integrate this mobile solution with the hospital
information system) is just another benefit of this solution. Furthermore, without the requirement for the
supporting network infrastructure this proposed solution will also be suitable for the remote regions of Australia
where the network availability is limited or unreliable.

CONCLUSION
Before the 6CPA was officially signed, there were concerns and various speculations regarding what the new
eligibility criteria will be for electronic prescription fees and how the subsidy will continue. Among them, eRx
persuaded users with the no cost policy even for non-eligible scripts. But, some of its publications mention that it
may not be able to maintain the cost neutral policy indefinitely but users would be given at least two month
notice prior to any change being implemented to the price structure ("eRx slashes e-script pricing", 2010;
O'Donoghue, 2012). So, effectively it does not even promise the users that it will remain cost neutral even with
the current Commonwealth’s AU$ 0.15 contribution for each electronic prescription. How the use eTP will
continue without the Commonwealth subsidy is rather an alarming thought. On the other hand, MediSecure
seems to try using a scare tactics on users by implying that the eligibility criteria for electronic prescription fees
will likely to be stricter in future ("How electronic prescription fee payment works?", 2015). For instance, from
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certain point in time during the 6CPA agreement period, the Commonwealth’s AU$ 0.15 subsidy will only be
applicable if the PES can share data with other eHealth components such as PCEHR and NPDR. From that
aspect, only their product, Script Vault, is capable of such enhancement with minimal disruption to the services
as it is the only PES service that fully complies with various eHealth and HL7 standards. When the 6CPA was
officially signed, the section 6.1.3 and Appendix B of the agreement state that from 1st July 2016 and onwards
this funding will be subject to a cost-effectiveness assessment by an independent health technology assessment
body as determined by the Minister ("The Pharmacy Guild of Australia", 2015). Therefore, instead of living in
fear of the potential change in the Commonwealth’s subsidy for the electronic prescription fees, this paper
proposed a cheaper (i.e. potentially cost-free) alternative with comparable security measures to the options
currently available.

REFERENCES
eRx slashes e-script pricing (2010). Retrieved October 17, 2016 from Pharmacy Daily: http://erx.com.au/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/eRx_Newsletter_May_2010.pdf
FAQs. (2016). Retrieved from eRx Script Exchange: http://www.erx.com.au/support/faqs/
How electronic prescription fee payment works? (2015). Retrieved October 17, 2016 from SlideShare:
http://www.slideshare.net/medisecure/how-electronic-prescription-fee-payment-works
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2015a). The Hare and the Hortoise [sic]: The Potential Versus
the Reality of eTP Implementation. In Proceedings of the 23rd Australian national Health Informatics
Conference 2015 (pp. 114-120). Brisbane, Australia.
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2015b). Security of ePrescription: Security of data at rest in
Prescription Exchange Services vs on Mobile Devices. In Proceedings of the 4th Australian eHealth
Informatics and Security Conference 2015. Perth, Australia.
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2016). Security of ePrescriptions: Data in Transit Comparison
Using Existing and Mobile Device Services. Manuscript submitted for publication.
NEHTA Blueprint V2. (2011). Retrieved July 21, 2016 from Australian Digital Health Agency:
https://www.nehta.gov.au/implementation-resources/ehealth-foundations/nehta-blueprint
O'Donoghue, N. (2012). Real-time claiming set to ease pharmacy red tape. Retrieved October 17, 2016 from
Pharmacy News: http://www.pharmacynews.com.au/news/latest-news/real-time-claiming-set-to-easepharmacy-red-tape?t=636112320827921123
The Pharmacy Guild of Australia. (2015). Sixth Community Pharmacy Agreement (2015-2020). Retrieved from
https://www.guild.org.au/the-guild/community-pharmacy-agreement
White, J. (2015). Benefits of e-prescribing for hospitals. Retrieved October 17, 2016 from Healthcare Business
& Technology: http://www.healthcarebusinesstech.com/e-prescribing-hospitals/

59

ACCELERATING NTRUEncrypt FOR
IN-BROWSER CRYPTOGRAPHY UTILISING
GRAPHICAL PROCESSING UNITS AND WEBGL
Dajne Win, Seth Hall, Alastair Nisbet
Security & Forensics Research Group, Auckland University of Technology,
Auckland, New Zealand
dwin@aut.ac.nz, shall@aut.ac.nz, anisbet@aut.ac.nz

Abstract
One of the challenges encryption faces is it is computationally intensive and therefore slow, it is vital to find
faster methods to accelerate modern encryption algorithms to keep performance high whilst also preserving
information security. Users often do not want to wait for applications to become responsive, applications on
limited devices such as mobiles often compromise security in order to keep execution times quick. Often they
use algorithms and key sizes which are not considered cryptographically secure in order to maintain a smooth
user experience. Emerging approaches have begun using a devices Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) to offload
some of the computational burden from the Central Processing Unit (CPU) in an effort to parallelize and
accelerate the encryption algorithms. Programming for a GPU often involves the use of CUDA or OpenCL
programming, however these approaches are platform dependant. This research focuses on utilizing a GPU to
perform in-browser cryptography using WebGL and JavaScript. This allows any GPU-enabled device capable
of launching an OpenGL compatible browser to perform GPU accelerated cryptography. A GPU based
implementation of the NTRUEncrypt algorithm was created and tested against a CPU based version on a range
of hardware devices with results, challenges and limitations discussed.
Keywords
NTRUEncrypt, GPU, browser, cryptography, encryption, WebGL.

INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is one of the tools available to facilitate secure communication between two parties. Whilst
cryptography provides confidentiality of communications between the two parties, it also, when applied
correctly, allows for integrity, authentication and non-repudiation (Rivest 1990). One issue with cryptography
on mobile devices is that it is computationally expensive meaning when high speed networking is utilised the
encryption and decryption of messages on the device can become a bottleneck for the message exchanges,
slowing down the communication exchange.
Whilst developments in cryptography has seen greatly improved security of cryptography with more
sophisticated and robust encryption algorithms developed in the last few decades, the speed of encryption and
decryption has suffered from the increased complexity of the cryptographic processes (Kapoor, Pandya et al.
2011). The Central Processing Unit (CPU) of a device is fixed hardware that must handle complex calculations
for the processing of many functions on the devices. The design of the CPU on mobile devices is deliberately
conservative as it must be small, consume little battery power and produce minimal heat. It therefore tends
towards being designed to provide high speed processing but at its limit of available processing power. This
leaves little available processing power when complex additional computations are required for cryptographic
processes.
The GPU on a mobile device is required to deal with processing of graphical images which may at times require
only a small percentage of the available processing power that the unit is capable of handling. This, along with
the multiple processes within a single GPU mean that much additional processing power is available but
generally not utilised. The ability to direct this additional processing power towards cryptographic requirements
therefore has considerable benefits in permitting the most secure cryptographic algorithms to be utilised at high
speed for message exchanges (Harrison and Waldron 2010). Whilst the idea of utilising the GPU of a device for
processing of non-graphical requirements is not new, the restrictions that have been imposed by previous
designs means that only a select few devices are capable of implementing this technology and reaping the
benefits of the additional GPU processing power. This paper describes the development of a GPU accelerated
NTRU Encrypt algorithm used for in-browser cryptography. It uses the WebGL and Three.js libraries for the
purpose of trying to utilise the algorithm on any browser enabled device.
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STATE OF THE ART
The Data Encryption Standard ratified in 1977 provided a robust and reliable symmetric encryption algorithm
suitable for public and government use. With only 56 bit encryption permitted to comply with the contemporary
laws restricting encryption to this key size, Data Encryption Standard (DES) remained suitable until technology
surpassed the protection afforded by such a small key length. Triple DES (3DES) acted as an intermediary fix to
provide significantly stronger encryption without the need for an entirely new algorithm. However, 3DES was
computationally expensive and with security weakening as computer processing increased rapidly, the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was developed in 1998 as a result of a competition for a replacement for
DES and 3DES (Daemen and Rijmen 2003). Both 3DES and AES are commonplace and whilst AES is much
preferred, 3DES remains as the encryption algorithm of choice for many banking applications. AES is
computationally expensive which for computer applications is suitable but for mobile devices with much less
processing power can slow message exchanges in some circumstances.
In 2015, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that it could no longer support
continued use of the 2 key 3DES version and recommended utilising 3 key 3DES or move to AES (Barker and
Barker 2004). The banking industry has been slow to respond and 2 key 3DES remains in many banking
communications, however the move to AES seems inevitable as more and more research into the insecurity of
DES in all varieties appears.
The need to accelerate AES and other encryption processing on these devices has seen some improvements
through new processes but so far all restrict the new processes to specific hardware. In 2007, experiments with
accelerating AES by utilising a GPU showed significant improvements with bulk processing of AES (Harrison
and Waldron 2007). The same year saw further experiments with AES and DES which achieved improvements
of over 100% throughput with a GPU compared to a high performance CPU (Yang and Goodman 2007). In both
of these experiments the limiting factor for improved processing was found to be the memory bandwidth rather
than the GPU processing units on each card as each card required the same number of memory fetch units. In
2012 experiments by Chesebrough and Conlon showed a significant increase in cryptographic processing of
AES-NI of 5 times greater than previous experiments (Chesebrough and Conlon 2012).
The move to parallel computing has seen great benefits in processing speed but at the expense of heat generation
(Oancea, Andrei et al. 2014). Technology has moved rapidly from the original 8086 processer with 29 000
transistors to the Intel core i7-920 released in 2014 with 731 000 000 transistors to 1.9 billion transistors by
2015, all within approximately the same sized footprint of the CPU (Kowaliski 2015). Whilst multiple cores
have somewhat alleviated the heat generation problems, the computing power requirements have increased at a
greater rate than development so that higher performance from software remains ahead of the CPU development
(Oancea, Andrei et al. 2014).
The area for greatly improved processing power at little cost is in Graphical Processing Unit utilisation as a
defacto CPU. Nvidia GPUs utilise Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) stream architecture which has the
advantage over Single Instruction Single Data (SISD) of providing natural parallelism and therefore processes
data simultaneously (Nvidia 2008). Nvidia’s modification of SIMD is termed Streaming Multiprocessors (SM)
and places emphasis on ease of development by reducing the complexity of the design. This has seen significant
research in the area of GPU accelerated cryptography tied to Nvidia’s hardware because of the simplicity with
which developers can utilise development platforms such as Compute Unified Device Architecture by NVidia
(CUDA), (Yang and Goodman 2007).
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Figure 1: CPU v GPU processors (Nvidia, 2008)
As illustrated in Figure 1, the main difference in processing of a CPU compared to a GPU is that a CPU may
consist of several cores with a control bus for communication meaning that the CPU does not perform in a truly
parallel manner. The GPU is made up of many floating point units, with each unit dedicated to performing
arithmetic tasks and when combined in a truly parallel manner produce a truly SIMD architecture which is
considerable faster than the CPU. In 2008 an Nvidia 8800 GTX was utilised as it allowed for the use of DirectX
10, CUDA and a 32 bit integer processor (Harrison and Waldron 2009). They noted the necessity of taking into
account different memory architectures to improve performance as whilst there is some local storage available,
most is off-chip making transfers comparably slower. The competing architecture is OpenCL (Open Computing
Language) and there has been significant research into utilising GPU’s of each type but specific to the type
being accelerated. This emphasis on writing software to accelerate the Nvidia architecture or the OpenCL
architecture has meant that developments work for one technology but not the other.
Accelerated programming has become a necessity not just because of the increased speed of computing
applications but because of the greatly increased expectations of the users. In 1994, Nielson’s research found
that 0.1 seconds of latency after performing a task such as selecting a key on a keyboard or dragging the mouse
pointer across a screen could be considered instantaneous. Similar research by Ritter et al in 2015 found that 300
milliseconds was acceptable as a maximum latency with 170 milliseconds required for more urgent tasks (Ritter,
Kempter et al. 2015).
The issue with acceleration of processing by utilising the GPU has potential to be overcome by the
implementation of acceleration in JavaScript. All modern web browsers support the use of JavaScript (Flanagan
2011) and with the introduction of HTML5 JavaScript has moved from a simple scripting language to an
efficient programming language. With a doubling of Internet connected devices occurring every two years
(Gartner 2015) , the motivation to improve processing speeds on mobile devices becomes very apparent. An
early attempt in 2012 to implement JavaScript on a GPU utilising OpenCL rather than the Nvidia architecture on
an Intel i7 processor proved unsuccessful at accelerating the processing but did prove that it was technically
possible to at least do so (Nicholls 2012). One benefit of a successful implementation is that client side
acceleration of processing functions could occur efficiently, alleviating some of the burden of the processing
from the servers. The first investigation into utilising the GPU for accelerating cryptographic functions using
JavaScript occurred in 2006 (Cook and Keromytis 2006). Their experiments targeted the AES algorithm but
problems were experienced in the areas of a lack of modular arithmetic, unsigned integers, branching and large
integers. Yang and Goodman directly furthered the experiments and gained some positive results primarily
because of the development of the technology in the 1 year period (Yang and Goodman 2007). In that time,
branching and unsigned integers no longer proved difficult to handle but large integers remained a problem.
Two years later, experiments of a similar nature but with asymmetric cryptography also showed some positive
success but with some limitations (Harrison and Waldron 2009). Their research involved accelerating 1024 bit
RSA encryption and they were able to show higher throughput and decreased latency by utilising the Nvidia
GPU. Since 2010, little advancements have been made in accelerated cryptography utilising the GPU although
hardware advances have made the area far more promising for success.
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This issue with all of these previous experiments remained that they were all targeted to a particular type of
GPU architecture, either Nvidia or OpenCL but not both. To be universally beneficial, what is clearly needed is
software in JavaScript that will accelerate cryptography in both architectures. The following section outlines the
research design for the software development.

RESEARCH DESIGN
This research used an experimental research design methodology which allows for control over the variables
defined in the experiment, allowing more accurate results to determine relationships between sets of data. The
purpose of running experiments with software that is developed to improve performance over currently
available software is to show that the new scheme has benefits over previous schemes. A performance
benchmark of what is currently available is one method of showing that improvements have been made with the
new scheme by way of comparison between the older and the new scheme. Crypto++ has been chosen as the
cryptographic scheme to be used in the comparison. Crypto++ is an open source library of several cryptographic
algorithms and the version that is used in this research provides for AES encryption. Utilising the JavaScript
software and RSA (Rivest, Shamir et al. 1978) cryptography as well as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
(Koblitz 1987). The JavaScript is run encrypting NTRUEncrypt and the resulting data used to compare against
previous schemes. The hardware utilised for the testing can be divided into 3 distinct types, mobile, desktop and
laptop, and server. These are shown in the following tables (Table 1 and 2) as well as the CPU, GPU, RAM and
operating systems used.
Table 1: Mobile platforms tested

Table 2: PC desktop platforms tested

Initial tests were run to check that the systems were working as expected and results were being correctly
recorded. Once this was satisfied, the experiments could begin.

TESTING & RESULTS
This research focused on utilizing the GPU in an attempt to optimize NTRUEncrypt (Hoffstein, Pipher et al.
1998) algorithm for in-browser cryptography. In order to target a variety of different devices, a Javascript
version of NTRUEncrypt was developed using Three.js, which is a cross-browser library using WebGL and is
primarily used for computer graphics. The experiments compared both Javascript CPU and GPU
implementations of NTRU encrypt to test whether it could be beneficial to utilize the GPU for in-browser
cryptography. Average throughput results after 500 iterations for each version of NTRU on the various
platforms were recorded and compared. Porting an algorithm to GPU brings a number of challenges in order to
port the algorithm to be more suitable for the GPU pipeline such as reducing code branching, fixing float values
to between 0-1 within the GPU, and floating point precision errors. There is also limits on the buffer sizes and
number of uniform values that are passed into the each shader. NTRUEncrypt is was used as it is considered to
be fast compared to other asymmetric encryption algorithms (Hermans, Vercauteren et al. 2010) with
comparable security settings and “quantum resistant” (Perlner and Cooper 2009), making it an ideal choice for
future cryptography systems.
The algorithm was first tested with small set NTRU parameters (N=11) and progressing upwards to higher sets
(N=1499, ees1499ep1) which become more computationally intensive to encrypt. The following values
represent NTRU parameter sets considered to be cryptographically secure (Figure 2) (Inc 2014).

63

Figure 2: Recommended NTRU parameter steps
The following GPU pipeline diagram (Figure 3) shows the parts to the implemented algorithm. The first stage of
the pipeline takes in the public key and blinding values as byte arrays into the convolution shader. The output of
which is then fed into the second shader where a polynomial addition modulo by the value q is performed on the
plaintext to get its corresponding ciphertext.

Public
key

Blinding
Values

Plaintext
(4 blocks)

Convolution
Shader

Polynomial
Addition
Shader

ciphertext
(4 blocks)

Figure 3: NTRUEncrypt GPU pipeline model
Because of the SIMD nature of GPU, the algorithm utilized vec4 operations within the GPU meaning that
processing four blocks of plaintext can be converted to four ciphertext blocks with little to no extra
computational cost over simply converting one block. The GPU implementation of NTRUEncrypt was tested
and compared to a pure CPU implementation also implemented in Javascript and used as a benchmark
comparison. The following table (Table 3) shows the results for the ees401ep1 parameter set on custom
desktop.
Table 3: GPU vs CPU average throughput results in milliseconds for ees401ep1

Unfortunately it appears that no outright acceleration was achieved and in fact the algorithm execution time was
significantly slower. This is because the nature of the algorithm for NTRU is difficult to parallelize, in
particular the polynomial addition part of the algorithm. The algorithm took on average 2.1mS to encrypt one
block of plaintext for the CPU implementation whereas the GPU implementation took on average 230.5mS to
encrypt four blocks of plaintext held inside a vec4 buffer. Custom desktop was only able to handle ees401ep1
parameters due to the restrictions of OpenGL set on the GPU. The results are also affected by the setup time for
Three.js and overhead on WebGL calling shader instances as it is simply meant to be a graphics library and not
intended for high performance computing and cryptography. Furthermore hardware issues affected results due
to their poor implementation of WebGL as although it is stated that it is OpenGL compliant, not all the
standards are met. Furthermore the mobile devices tested also failed to perform the algorithm correctly due to
lack of float buffer support.
However the following graph (Figure 4) shows results performed on the HP Elite desktop and demonstrates that,
utilizing the GPU becomes advantageous when using the ees1449ep1 parameter sets for higher security levels as
using a pure CPU approach becomes computationally burdensome using parameter sets over ees887ep1.
Interestingly using very low spec parameters for NTRU on the GPU was slow compared to higher specification
parameters, this is due to under-utilization of GPU cores. Furthermore only the original NTRUEncrypt
algorithm was implemented, (Inc 2014) has suggested several enhancements to the algorithm which may be
advantageous for reducing computation time for encryption/decryption on GPU.
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Figure 4: CPU vs GPU average throughput results on HP Elite desktop for increasing NTRU parameter sets

CONCLUSIONS
The ability to accelerate cryptography on limited devices is essential in order for applications to use encryption
schemes which are considered cryptographically secure whilst still maintaining a smooth user experience. This
paper looked at utilizing the GPU for in-browser cryptography using NTRUEncrypt as a case study. Not all the
hardware platforms tested were able to accelerate the NTRUEncrypt algorithm, however the HP Elite Desktop
was able to achieve GPU acceleration with the ees1449ep1 parameter set. Browsers poor implementations of
WebGL affect performance in calling shaders for non-graphics purposes, however with the rise of GPU
implementing compute shader pipelines then using GPU for non-graphics purposes could become more
commonplace. Modern browsers will see the implementation of WebGL 2.1 in the near future which will have
direct support for compute shaders (Jackson and Gilbert 2015). Using compute shaders is more useful for
utilizing the GPU for non-graphics tasks such as high performance computing and cryptography. Future work
will investigate using compute shader further by trying to improve throughput performance of a GPU-based
NTRUEncrypt algorithm. A preliminary C++ implementation with the full OpenGL pipeline, utilizing compute
shaders has been developed with beta results that are promising. The implementation was able to process four
blocks of plaintext using the ees1499ep1 parameters in 18mS on the HP Elite Desktop. This is a significant
improvement compared to the 80mS shown in this papers in-browser GPU JavaScript version. This shows that
the ability to use GPU to accelerate cryptography algorithms has the potential to increase security and
intelligence capabilities. However there is still a long way to go in order for it to be fully supported by browsers
so it can be then used for in-browser cryptography. For now applications could still benefit from GPU
acceleration by creating a direct port into the compute shader pipeline or using platform dependant alternatives
such as CUDA or Open CL.
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Abstract
This research utilises a comprehensive survey to ascertain the level of social networking site personal
information disclosure by members at the time of joining the membership and their subsequent postings to the
sites. Areas examined are the type of information they reveal, their level of knowledge and awareness regarding
how their information is protected by SNSs and the awareness of risks that over-sharing may pose. Additionally,
this research studies the effect of gender, age, education, and level of privacy concern on the amount and kind
of personal information disclosure and privacy settings applied. A social experiment was then run for 3 months
that tested SNSs users’ reaction to a profile access request by a stranger. The research focused on four different
social networks: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,and Snapchat. The results of the survey and experiment found
that there is a significant amount of personal information disclosure, but that the level differs between social
networks. It is reveals that gender, age, and education have significant influences on information disclosure and
user’s privacy settings and that on most sites over 50% of friend requests were readily accepted. These results
are a selection from a comprehensive study of some of the more revealing facts about SNS user ship covering 3
months of data collection and almost 500 responses.
Keywords
privacy, security, social networks

INTRODUCTION
Social media and social networking sites (SNS) are now utilised by a large majority of Internet connected
people around the world. With the benefit of almost instant communication to potentially billions of other
people, the temptation may be to connect as simply and as quickly as possible to enjoy the benefits of social
media. With benefits, there are often drawbacks and the recent publicity of privacy breaches, identity theft and
the dangers of over-sharing, social media users signing up for and utilising the sites’ service should be wary of
just how much information they disclose. Of the many SNS’s available to consumers, Facebook, Twitter,
Snapchat and Instagram are currently the most heavily visited sites. Each site has a user’s conditions that are
available to be read when a new user creates an account with the site. Often, these agreements may not be fully
read or fully understood yet many users agree to the terms and continue to enter personal details to create their
account. Some sites have publicly available areas where non-members r general members who have had no
prior contact with a user’s page can view information posted by the member. At times, this information may be
of a personal nature that some members may wish to keep private or may be sufficient information to identify a
person, a place of residence or other uniquely identifying feature. It has been argued that advances in
communication technology have made people more tolerant and more willing to share information about
themselves in a way that renounces the value of privacy in order to be more connected and traceable,
specifically among younger generations (Tubaro, Casilli & Sarabi, 2014). Whilst much data exists regarding the
numbers of people utilising social media, often on a daily basis, the makeup of the users in relation to their
privacy settings and disclosure has been rarely examined.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Technological advancement has become less focused on connecting computers and more concerned about
connecting people. A main contributor to this evolution is the use of social networking sites (SNS), which has
seen explosive growth in use in the last couple of years (Zheleva, Terzi, & Getoor, 2012). As of August 2016,
there are more than 2.22 billion users of SNSs (Statista, 2016). Due to the increasing popularity of SNSs and
the drive to reach customers, more than 70% of businesses are now using SNSs (McKinsey Global Institute,
2012). Although SNSs provide a powerful tool to engage people over the web, they can be a source of possible
threats to users’ privacy and security because users routinely and voluntarily provide personal information
(Cross, 2016).
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Social networks initially started as websites where users only access to them was with a laptop or a desktop.
However, with the advancement of smartphones, social networks released mobile application versions of their
sites and other social networks developed mobile standalone applications for access. This development made it
easier and more convenient for users to access their online profiles and update more actively and in real time
(Aldhafferi, Watson, & Sajeev, 2013). However, the more accessible the social network, the easier it is to be
used and the more information the user tends to share (Coyle & Vaughn, 2008). SNSs have unquestionably a
strong social impact and the line between a person’s virtual and offline life may for some, become blurred.
SNSs have evolved over the years and have gone through many phases of development to reach their current
state (Hendricks, 2013). The first recognisable form of SNS that encouraged users to include personal
information about themselves for the purpose of social networking emerged in 1997 with a site called
SixDegrees (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). It allowed users to open personal accounts and create a list of friends.
SixDegrees attracted over a million subscribers at its peak (Chapman, 2009). However, although SixDegrees
managed to become popular and attract large numbers of subscribers, the site was not able to maintain its
popularity (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). In 2001, SixDegrees.com was shut down. According to the founder of
SixDegrees, the failure of his website was due to the fact that SixDegrees was ahead of its time: at that time, not
many people had friends who were online and the idea of being online friends with strangers had not yet gained
universal acceptance (Prall, 2010).
The concept of creating a virtual SNS inspired other developers (Liu, 2014). In the early 2000s, more people
started to have Internet access, hence the target audience became much broader. This helped the success and
increased the popularity of SNSs such as Friendster, which has attracted more than 90 million users. It
introduced the ability for users to discover their friends and then friends-of-friends, and thus expand their
networks and share more information with others.
The vast spread of SNSs started to occur at the start of 2003, initially when Myspace was launched, which grew
to be the most popular SNS in the world at that time (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). Myspace differentiated itself from
other competitors by giving users the freedom to customise the look of their profiles. In 2004, Facebook was
launched initially as a Harvard-only social network and became the most popular SNS in 2008, overtaking
Myspace. As of the second quarter of 2015, Facebook has 1.49 billion monthly active users (Statista, 2016).
Facebook managed to maintain its success by constantly improving the site and by adding new features
(Hendricks, 2013).
At the present time, hundreds of SNSs have emerged, each designed to serve a different audience or have a
different style that distinguishes it from other SNSs. Figure 1 shows the vast growth of SNSs from 2006 to
2012.

Figure 1: Growth of Online Social Networks, 2006-2012. (Source: White, 2013)
As of August 2016, there are over 2.34 billion social network users globally. This number is expected to
increase and reach 2.95 billion social networks users by 2020, which is close to a third of the world’s entire
population (Statista, 2016). The last decade has witnessed a rapid growth in the number of individuals using
SNSs. For instance, as of June 2016, Facebook was regarded as the third most used website globally after

68

Google and YouTube (Alexa, 2016). Although SNSs provide many benefits for individuals such as keeping in
touch with friends and family, privacy and security is regarded as a critical issue that can threaten the users of
SNSs (Donath, 2007). This is mainly because SNSs encourage their users to reveal a great deal of personal
information about themselves by promising them a better user experience if they do so (Luo, Liu, Liu, & Fan,
2009). For example when users first sign up to Facebook, they will be constantly asked and reminded by
Facebook to update their profile with more personal information such as date of birth, hometown, workplace,
and/or school in order to find more friends and enjoy the experience better (Lewis, n.d.). The growing
popularity of SNSs and the fact that they contain enormous amounts of information make these websites an
attractive target for malicious hackers. It is therefore vital that users are aware of the risks of disclosure of
personal information and how the information they disclose can be used by unscrupulous individuals to commit
crimes such as Fraud and other scams.
The following section discusses the research phases including design of the questionnaire.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The aim of this research is to shed the light on SNS user’s personal information disclosure behaviours, their
privacy protection settings, privacy policies and users SNS privacy knowledge and awareness. The study was
conducted to identify the effect of gender, education status, and age on the degree of personal information
disclosure and protective privacy settings applied by the user, using factor analysis. Four most common SNS
sites were selected as a cross section of social media sites, each giving a different purpose for the members and
viewers of the sites, from primarily text based to primary video and graphics based sites. These sites are
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat. An online survey was conducted which aimed to answer the
following proposed research questions.
Q1: What are the personal attributes that can have an influence on information disclosure and privacy settings
of SNS users?
Q2: Do users’ levels of privacy concern have an effect on the amount of information they disclose in social
networking sites?
Q3: Are users aware of how their information is protected by SNS providers according to the privacy policies
that the users have agreed to?
In addition, a further experiment was conducted to test how users react to stranger’s friendship of follow
requests. In this experiments, requests were sent to people the requestor had no prior personal knowledge of to
ascertain how likely it was that the friend request would be accepted.
Initially an online form was created with the link to the form posted on each of the four sites. In Twitter, for
example, the link for the survey was tweeted with trending hash-tags in order to ensure it had wide exposure. In
the post, there was a brief description of the survey in order to encourage users to take part in it. For the social
experiment, users were selected randomly from their participation in public pages such as newspapers or public
figures’ pages by either liking a post or commenting on a post. With a population of the four sites combined
reaching approximately 1.5 billion users, the confidence level of 95% and margin of error of 5% was found to
be appropriate. This meant that a minimum of 385 responses would be required for the survey to have this
validity.
Two stages of analysis were used in this research to derive the main findings.
1) Exploratory data analysis (EDA): In this stage, the data files are viewed before completion of the data
collection in order to get some ideas about the initial results. The purpose of this stage is that it may
indicate further data are required: for instance, there may be more female responses than male
responses, which could affect the accuracy of the results. This preliminary stage ensured that any
imbalances and limitations in the data were resolved before the end of the data collection period. This
stage overlaps with data cleaning because anomalies can become evident. Therefore, in an optimal
situation, before the end of this stage, there should be a clean dataset that is ready for the next stage of
analysis.
2) Deriving the main findings: This stage generates a summary of the findings, relationships, trends,
interpretations and narratives. When analysing the data, the type of questions dictate the type of
analysis. However, in general, two tools are used together to analyse the data. The first tool is filtering,
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which is provided by Survey Monkey to help break down the results in order to focus on a specific data
subset. It allows viewing specific respondents’ answers to specific questions. For instance, it allows
viewing of all the answers of male respondents who are between the ages of 20-24 years and who
answered that they do not trust SNS providers with their information. Secondly, the information is
transferred into SPSS in order to analyse it statistically. Factor analysis has been conducted. Separate
chi-square tests of contingencies were conducted in order to understand and determine the differences
in user privacy setting behaviours and personal information disclosure variables with gender, age,
education, and privacy rating for each of the four social networks. All chi-squares were interpreted at a
conservative alpha of .01 to control for multiple tests. The chi-square analysis helps to determine
whether two discrete variables have any statistical association and whether there is a statistical
significance between the variables.

RESULTS
The survey was run from January 2016 to March of that year and 415 people completed the survey. The first
question in the survey was: Which of the following Social Networking sites do you currently have an active
account with and use? (Check all that apply). The purpose of having this question at the start was to disqualify
any non-SNS users and to identify what SNSs the survey participant was currently using. The results revealed
that Snapchat was the dominant SNS among the four networks, with a response rate of 69.6%. Snapchat is the
newest social network between the other three networks. Facebook, which is one of the oldest SNSs, had the
lowest percentage of users in this survey at 55.9%. Table 1 represents the findings and the rankings of the SNSs
by the survey participants.
Table 1: Chosen SNSs by the users in the sample

Answer Choices

Responses

Facebook

55.90%

N=232

Twitter

56.87%

N=236

Instagram

60.96%

N=253

Snapchat

69.64%

N=289

None

3.37%

N=14

Total Respondents: 415
The next results looked at the membership of the four sites broken down into gender to identify if gender played
a role in choice of sites to join. Figure 2 shows that a majority of males (75.52%) in this sample used Facebook;
however, females used Facebook the least and Snapchat the most with 79.02%.

Figure 4.1 Male vs. Female Choice of SNS
One question was designed to determine the reason behind a user becoming a member of the site. With the
growing acceptance of SNS’s, this question looked at why people joined and was useful for also inferring why
many people who are regular Internet users continue to resist joining sites.
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Figure 3: Motivation for using sites
Figure 4 displays the frequency of SNS use by the survey participants. It shows that most of the members are
frequent users of SNSs, with 82.9% being daily users.

Figure 4: Frequency of site visits
Figure 5 presents the findings of the question “Is the privacy of your information on Social Networking sites a
major concern for you?” The purpose of this question was to establish the value of online privacy for the user,
which can affect their answers to other questions. For instance, if someone is not very concerned about the
privacy of their information online, they will likely not be so stringent in applying protective privacy and
security settings to avoid leakage of information. In addition, people who value their privacy and are more
concerned about their information will probably not share as much personal information compared to those who
are less worried about privacy.

Figure 5:Scale of concern over privacy
The results showed that there was a lack of trust in SNS providers with regard to storage and protection of users’
information, as 66.3% of the survey respondents answered that they did not trust their providers with their
information. These findings will be used later in this chapter to compare users’ actual actions with their levels of
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personal information disclosure and examine the ways they apply privacy settings to protect their information
and online identity. If users are disclosing personal information, then one method to hinder the use of
information by unscrupulous individuals is to use fake or partially fake identities. Figure 6 shows the percentage
of members who use their genuine name, fake name or partially fake name such as a genuine first name with a
fake surname.

Figure 6: Name disclosure in Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram and Twitter.
The next results looked at the information disclosure and privacy settings members used on the four sites. The
Facebook results are indicative of the four sites and indicate the varying level of disclosure people are willing to
make. More personal information tends to be kept private on the sites and more generic information such as the
city of residence tends to be more freely disclosed.
Table 2: Facebook: Personal information disclosure and privacy settings

Public

Friends

Customised
group of
friends

Total
Respondents

3.9%

I don't share
this
information
with others
6.1%

Hometown

53.9%

36.0%

Current city

52.8%

36.7%

4.8%

5.7%

229

Family members

24.9%

52.8%

7.4%

14.8%

229

Relationship status

29.3%

50.7%

4.8%

15.3%

229

Birthday

41.3%

47.8%

3.5%

7.4%

230

Education

44.5%

45.4%

3.5%

6.6%

227

Events

26.3%

5.7%

8.8%

228

Locations visited

24.3%

59.2%
135
55.7%

4.3%

15.7%

230

Friends List

26.8%

54.8%

6.6%

11.8%

228

Contact Information

22.2%

50.0%

7.0%

20.9%

230

228

Instagram is a site dedicated to allowing members to post pictures and videos. The site allows for a brief
description of the graphic or video allowing members a choice of how much information about the posting they
wish to disclose. Table 3 shows the results for this site.
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Table 3: Instagram: Types of personal information posted

I post pictures/videos of myself
I post pictures/videos of family members/friends
I include the real location of my pictures/videos
Sometimes I post a photo with my house location in the map
I include contact information in my profile
Does your profile picture contain a picture of yourself?

Yes

No

Total

55.7%
58.7%
69.4%
39.8%
59.6%
60.0%

44.3%
41.3%
30.6%
60.2%
40.4%
40.0%

271
269
271
269
270
160

The next series of questions in the survey focuses on the awareness of users of the security policy wordings and
the implications of accepting the site’s agreements. Much research has been done on users’ lack of careful
reading of acceptance policies and the results in table 4 indicate that users generally trust that the site will
protect their personal information. Careful reading of the policies tends to indicate otherwise in many cases with
some sites quite clear that any information, graphics or videos can be reproduced by the site or passed on for
any reason without the users permission.
Table 4: Facebook privacy policy awareness question: response frequency
Statement
Collect and use all the information they receive about
you to suggest advertisements for you
Track your web surfing anytime you're logged into the
site
Use your public information, such as your profile
picture, in ads without asking you first and without any
compensation to you
Collect information about your device locations,
including specific geographic locations, through GPS,
Bluetooth, or WiFi signals
None of the above

Proportion of survey participants who
do not believe that this statement is true
78 (33.6%)
43 (18.5%)
45 (19.4%)
59 (25.4%)
132 (56.9%)

With the increasing publicity about the risks of over-disclosure of personal information to strangers, many SNS
sites are responding by providing much tighter privacy settings for their users. Several sites now prevent
graphics searchers to their sites so that a simple search for a picture found on the Internet, even directly
downloaded from one of these sites, will often result in no matches on the site. These types of additional
security are designed to protect their users from stalking and identity theft. However, these measures only
provide greater resistance to these types of criminal acts if users are cautious about whom they permit to view
their private information reserved for ‘accepted’ friends. Table 5 shows the results from setting up a fake profile
and then requesting to ‘friend’ these strangers. Strangers were chosen as randomly as possible by selecting
pages during browsing of users’ sites. Results show that acceptance rates vary between sites but that 3 out of the
4 sites have greater than 50% acceptance of these fake friends.
Table 5: Acceptance rate for fake profiles on Snapchat, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram
Users added

Users accepted the add

Frequency of acceptance

Snapchat

400

120

30%

Facebook

400

245

61.25%

Twitter

400

233

58%

Instagram

400

224

56%

The next point of interest was designed to ascertain generilastions from the four sites about whether gender
played a significant role in how much personal information was disclosed. As an example which is
representative of all sites, Facebook results are shown in table 6. These results indicate that gender does play a
role in personal information disclosure with males more likely to disclose personal information than females in
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every category. One interesting result from the survey is that in most cases there is no difference between the
genders on accepting friend requests. It would appear from this result that the sociability of the members is
something accepted by males and females equally.
Table 6: Facebook: Gender Chi-square description of results
Attribute
Hometown

Current City

-

Family members
Relationship status
Birthday
Education

Events

Locations visited

Friends list

Contact information

-

Results of cross -tabs and Chi Square analysis
Males more likely than females to be public
Females more likely than males to be friends
Females more likely than males to be “don’t share
Males more likely than females to be public
Females more likely than males to be friends
Females more likely than males to be “don’t share”
Males more likely to be public than females
Females more likely to “not share’ than males
Males more likely to be public than females
Females more likely to “not share’ than males
Males more likely than females to be public
Females more likely than males to be friends
Males more likely than females to be public
Females more likely than males to be friends
Females more likely than males to “not share”
Males more likely than females to be public
No difference on friends
Females more likely to “not share”
Males more likely than females to be public
No difference on friends
Females more likely to “not share”
Males more likely than females to be public
No difference on friends
Females more likely to “not share”
Males more likely than females to be public
No difference on friends
Females more likely to “not share”

Finally, Snapchat results are shown in figure 6 for posting of personal photos and videos. Snapchat promises to
permanently delete these photos and videos after a short time but there has been a greater public awareness
recently that they are in fact quite easily recoverable from devices that have viewed these items and that the site
owners generally retail rights to these often very personal photographs. Results indicate that females are much
more likely to post pictures of friends and family members and that younger people tend to be much less
concerned by posting these types of personal family and friend pictures and videos.
Table 6: Snapchat Chi-square analysis results for posting pictures/videos that include family members/friends
Gender
Age

Education

Privacy

Male
Female
16-24
25-34
35+
High school
Bachelor
Masters
Doctoral
Rarely/Never
Sometimes
Mostly
Always

Yes

74(56.9%)
122(77.7%)
119(75.8%)
61(62.9%)
16(47.1%)
41(83.7%)
104(68%)
42(59.2%)
9(60%)
42(84.0%)
46(60.5%)
44(67.7%)
64(66%)

No

56(43.1%)
35(22.3%)
38(24.2%)
36(37.1%)
18(59.9%)
8(16.3%)
49(32%)
29(40.8%)
6(40%)
8(16%)
30(39.5%)
21(32.3%)
33(34%)
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CONCLUSION
The results from the survey are a selection of several of the more interesting points taken from the findings. The
questionnaire comprised of over 30 different questions with many diverse areas of SNS privacy investigated.
This selection of results shows that many factors comprise the profile decisions of users and those who choose to
join as members. The publicity over the risks of disclosing private information that may be used to construct fake
profiles, stalking and other nefarious activity seems to have had little effect on many SNS users. The desire to be
part of a community, often with hundreds of friends, most of which the person will never meet and who
themselves may be using fake identities, seems to have only a modest effect on the users’ sense of caution. The
results indicate that people are generally willing to use real names, disclose personal attributes such as dates of
birth and hometown locations and often post personal pictures that could identify themselves, family members
and friends. The use of privacy settings where only ‘friends’ can view posts, videos or pictures is largely negated
by the ready acceptance of both males and females to accept friend requests from people whom they have no
prior knowledge of and no method to ascertain the genuineness of the identity or desire to follow them. These
results indicate that whilst the messages about the risks of over-disclosure are regularly repeated, most social
networking site users are making their own decisions about what they wish to disclose and often these decisions
are not fully informed by the reading the user agreements and are putting users at risk because of their desire to
belong to these communities and share their information with strangers.
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Abstract
The purpose of automated traffic light systems is to safely and effectively manage the flow of vehicles through
(usually) urban environments. Through the use of wireless-based communication protocols, sets of traffic lights
are increasingly being connected to larger systems and also being remotely accessed for management purposes,
both for monitoring and emergency purposes. These protocols, however, were not designed with security as a
primary requirement, thus systems may operate with sub-standard or non-existent security implementations. This
research aims to test if the same issues and vulnerabilities that appear to be present in traffic light systems in the
USA are prevalent in Australia, specifically, Perth. There is evidence of weaknesses in traffic systems in Eastern
Australia and by undertaking this research the conjecture that the same weaknesses may be present in Perth
traffic systems can be answered. While none of three common wireless protocols (ZigBee, Bluetooth or Wi-Fi)
were found to be in-use, the discovery of a large, consistent network pulse warranted further investigation at one
specific intersection.

Keywords
Wireless Protocol, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber Security

INTRODUCTION
Traffic lights have existed in some form for over a century, with the first coloured signal light system appearing
in 1914 in London, England (Helmer, Meth, & Young, 2015), consisting of two semaphore arms lit by gas
lights. Mueller (1970) notes that by 1915 parts of America were trialling a similar system except it incorporated
electric lights and contained a small rotary compressor to blow a whistle, a method well-established at the time
by on-duty policemen to control traffic. In 1920 the first three-light (Red, Amber and Green) system was
installed in Detroit, Michigan and represents the beginning of what would be conventionally recognised as the
modern traffic light.
These early lights are somewhat unsophisticated compared to the traffic lights in use today. Mladenovic (2012)
states that traffic lights are now part of a much larger system that is controlled by a central computer using
programs such as SCATS (Sydney Coordinated Adaptive Traffic System) or SCOOT (Split Cycle Offset
Optimisation Technique). These systems can measure traffic volumes used in road sensors and adjust light
timings to allow for the most efficient flow of traffic, not only in a single set of traffic lights, but throughout a
whole city.
The motivation for efficient movement of traffic is simple: traffic jams cost time and therefore money. Hodson
(2014) estimates that the combined economic loss from traffic congestion for France, the UK, Germany and the
USA will increase from USD $200 billion in 2013 to $293 billion by 2030. The total economic losses equate to
$4.4 trillion over this 17 year period. These figures represent both the direct (cost of fuel and time wasted) and
indirect costs (increased cost of doing business) caused by traffic congestion. The study predicts that the average
hours wasted in traffic will increase by 6% by 2030. It also highlighted the environmental cost of this
congestion, suggesting that in the four countries studied, idling vehicles released 15,434 kilotons of CO 2 into the
atmosphere and that this figure will increase to 17,959 kilotons by 2030. Therefore, any attack (cyber-based or
otherwise) on systems that control traffic need only be moderately successful to have a large impact on the
economic well-being of a country.
Traffic systems are a vital part of the critical infrastructure of any city, and a city’s economic and social wellbeing is dependent on the smooth movement of people and freight. It could therefore be assumed that any
disruption to this system will have some form of impact. This does not have to be a major disruption to have a
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potentially devastating effect, for example consider emergency vehicles not being able to get to where they have
to be because they are caught in a traffic jam caused by a traffic system failure (Kelly, 2001).
Cerrudo (2014) claims to able to hack into the traffic lights in several United States cities, including Washington
DC and New York City, and potentially alter the timings of the signals. Cerrudo (2014) showed how to intercept
the wireless signals that were being transmitted from a sensor node in the roadway to a traffic controller located
on the road-side using commercial off the shelf tools. The specific system in question is produced and marketed
by Sensys Networks which, according to their sales literature, is used extensively around the world including
Australia (Ford, 2015).
This research aims to test if the same identified issues and vulnerabilities that appear to be present in traffic light
systems in the USA are prevalent in Australia, specifically, in the city of Perth. The remainder of the paper
describes some specific instances of traffic or traffic-related attacks, defines the experimental methodology used
and discusses the findings of the research.

SECURITY ISSUES IN TRAFFIC LIGHT SYSTEMS
Much like the advancement of other service-based systems, traffic lights were not designed with security as a
principal requirement. Early security of these systems revolved around physical isolation and proprietary
protocols. However, with increased connectivity for remote management and operation, and the use of common
protocols for interoperability, the security through obscurity paradigm no longer applies to these critical systems.
There is limited peer-reviewed research on the security of traffic lights. Estrin (2013) reports that in September
2013 cyber-terrorists attacked the traffic system in the Israeli city of Haifa, targeting the security camera network
on the Carmel Tunnels toll road with what was believed to be a Trojan malware programme. The attack was
carried out sporadically over two days, resulting in the roadway being shut down during the peak hour period,
and remaining shut for a period of eight hours on the second day. The resulting traffic jam not only caused long
delays to the commuters caught in it, but could have other less visible flow-on effects. These include the cost of
any type of traffic congestion to business and risk to life should emergency vehicles be stopped or delayed by the
traffic jam (Bernasek, 2014; Kelly, 2001, Schrank, Eisele, & Lomax, 2012). While this attack was an extreme
case, with driverless cars currently in the trial phase, security issues in traffic light systems are a risk that will
need to be managed, given the increased automated interaction between driverless cars and traffic light systems
(Petit & Shladover, 2014). There has been limited research into the vulnerabilities of these systems carried out in
the USA (Cerrudo, 2014; Ghena, et al., 2014), with very little consideration of whether these same
vulnerabilities are present in systems used in Australia.
A team from the University of Michigan (Ghena et al., 2014) investigated local traffic light systems. In the
Michigan area, traffic light systems use induction loops below the ground to detect cars, which then
communicate using wireless signals between the traffic controllers and the central server. The central server is
capable of making modifications to the light timings dependent on the information it receives from the induction
loop sensors, to dynamically avoid or alleviate traffic congestion. Each traffic intersection is treated as an
individual isolated system, with communication and coordination between intersections undertaken using a
central server. The protocol used for these wireless communications is a proprietary protocol similar to 802.11
Wi-Fi; which presents an SSID visible from a normal laptop or smartphone.
With the cooperation of a road agency in Michigan, Ghena et al (2014) went on to show that it was possible to
compromise traffic lights in Michigan by using the communication radio signals used by the network. These fell
into two ranges, 5.8GHz for short distance in-line signals and 900MHz for longer distances blocked by buildings
or other obstacles. They found three major problems with these traffic communications:
1.

Wireless signals were not encrypted

2.

Default usernames and passwords were used

3.

Known exploits could be used

These weaknesses allowed for attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS), timing manipulations to cause
congestion and the ability to exploit these weaknesses while driving to ensure a green light wherever you go.
It was shown that at least in these types of traffic controllers the more extreme claims of deaths or accidents
resulting from all the lights turning green are highly unlikely unless physical access to the traffic control box can
be achieved, because a hardware system is in place which stops this event happening.

77

Government Audits
Similar to the US, there is little publicly-available information about the security of traffic systems in Australia.
There have, however, been two Australian State Governments that have run audits on their traffic systems in the
past five years, with both identifying a number of weaknesses (Gaskell et al., 2015; QUA, 2013).
The Queensland Government audit undertaken before the 2014 G20 conference in Brisbane identified a lack of
security understanding, and a wide range of security issues. The report states, “The traffic management systems
for the Brisbane metropolitan area were not secure. If the systems were specifically targeted, hackers could
access the system and potentially cause traffic congestion, public inconvenience and affect emergency response
times. Such attacks could also cause appreciable economic consequences in terms of lost productivity. It was
identified that these issues were caused due to increased connectivity between control systems and the Internet
for remote management purposes” (QUA, 2013). A similar audit, released by the Audit Office of New South
Wales in 2015 also found significant security issues in the traffic management system, stating that the risk
management process put in place had covered the Transport Management Centre infrastructure, but the scope did
not include the traffic network. Of note was one particular section of the road network, which had an identified
lack of security and could lead to traffic disruptions, avoidable accidents or even the loss of life (Gaskell et al.,
2015). These audits did not disclose specific details of the vulnerabilities discovered, but it is clear from the
findings that there were concerns as to the security of the traffic system at a holistic level. In response to these
audits the relevant government departments of both states have stated that they have made, or are making the
necessary changes to the systems, security practices and security education and awareness training for staff. At
this time there is no evidence the WA government has audited the traffic control systems in Perth, in relation to
their susceptibility to cyber-attack. The aim of this research is thus to investigate if wireless security issues of
traffic sensors, identified in the US, and in operation in Eastern Australia, are in use and/or prevalent in Perth.

RESEARCH METHOD
The research was designed as a number of field experiments, where a combination of appropriate hardware and
software resources were used to try and detect, capture and then analyse specific wireless communication used
by a selection of traffic lights in Perth. Each step (hypothesis, defined in Table 1) is dependent on its precursor.
The initial focus of this research was to ascertain if the same wireless security issues described by Cerrudo
(2014) were present in traffic systems used in Perth. There was evidence that these systems are in use in
Melbourne (“M80 FWY Management System”, 2012; “Sensys networks freeway solutions, Melbourne”, 2010),
so there was a possibility that they could also be in use here in Perth.
To answer the key research question, viz. “Could the same security concerns highlighted in America in regard
to ZigBee be present in the traffic systems here in Perth?”, a number of hypotheses were proposed and are
presented in Table 1.
The research was focused on the way traffic light systems communicate at the intersection level and whether
specific wireless communications, namely ZigBee, are used. ZigBee was selected because, whilst Cerrudo,
(2014) did not specify the protocol he examined, it is clear from the evidence he presented that he protocol was
ZigBee. The field experiments to examine these communications were undertaken between March and June
2016 at multiple traffic intersections in Perth. These intersections were chosen because they allowed easy and
safe access and represented a cross section of the traffic lights in the eastern and western suburbs of Perth.
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Table 1: Hypotheses to be tested
Hypotheses
H1: ZigBee can be detected in use for wireless communication by traffic lights in Perth.
H2: The ZigBee packets used by the traffic lights can be captured for analysis.
H3: The ZigBee traffic used by the traffic lights is encrypted.
H4: Default settings for authentication are being used by ZigBee traffic systems.
H5: ZigBee traffic is susceptible to attack with the KillerBee framework.
H6: New nodes can connect to the traffic system using zbassocflood to a point where the
system overloads.
H7: Legitimate commands can be sent to the traffic system using zbreplay and accepted.
H8: Legitimate commands are accepted and can be used to change the timings of the traffic
lights.
Materials
The initial aim of capturing transmitted packets involved passively sniffing at the traffic intersection; to do this
the following equipment was used:
1.

HP Laptop (Pavillion dv6) with Windows 8.1 (64 bit) operating system

2.

VMware Workstation 12 Player virtual machine running Kali-linux-2016.1-amd64

3.

Wireshark version 2.0.1 installed as part of Kali-linux-2016.1-amd64

4.

Atmel RZUSBstick antenna configured to work with the ZigBee protocol

5.

KillerBee 1.0 Framework running on Kali-linux-2016.1-amd64

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
According to Main Roads WA, Perth has over 850 sets of traffic lights in use throughout the metropolitan area
(“Traffic Signals”, 2015). These traffic lights are controlled using SCATS and a typical layout for the overall
system is shown in Figure 1, whilst Figure 2 shows a typical intersection layout.

Figure 1: SCATS Control Hierarchy Layout.
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The intersections examined consisted of a series of in-road sensors (induction loops) that are connected to a road
side control box, which is subsequently connected to both the traffic lights and the regional control centre.
A car moving down the road is picked up by the in-road sensor, which sends this information to the roadside
control box. The information is then sent back to the regional computer that performs an analysis, consisting of
all the information provided by the other intersections in the area that it controls. The stated configuration gives
the regional controller an overview of traffic conditions in a wide area, allowing intelligent decisions to be made
to adjust traffic light times accordingly. The most appropriate timings are then sent back to the roadside
controller, which then implements the timings through control of the associated traffic lights (Dineen & Cahill,
2001). A central control centre manages the regional controllers, allowing oversight and manual manipulation of
the system when necessary, such as in emergencies.

Figure 2: Typical Traffic Light Road layout, retrieved from Agarwal (2013)
Captures of the ZigBee protocol were attempted at ten different intersections in Perth, these tests being
attempted on two separate occasions at each intersection and when possible, on different days and times. No
traffic was detected on any channel, thus disproving H 1 and effectively invalidating the remaining hypotheses
defined in Table 1. This result led to a re-focusing and re-evaluation of the research goal whereby other
common wireless protocols were examined. The research question was re-framed as:
“Is there any evidence that other wireless communication protocols are being used to transmit data between the
components that make up an intersection set of traffic lights in Perth, specifically:
a.

Is Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15.1) used in the majority of traffic lights in Perth?

b.

Is Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) used in the majority of traffic lights in Perth?”

Additional appropriate hypotheses were developed accordingly, to test the revised research question.
In addition to the materials described in the previous section, extra hardware (an Ubertooth One antenna 201510-R1) and software (Spectools -2015-10-R1) were utilised to enable detection and capture of these identified
protocols.
Testing was undertaken at the same intersections as the ZigBee testing. A Spectools scan using the Ubertooth
One was run at each intersection- a typical example being shown in Figure . The green line represents Bluetooth
transmissions while the white lines are Wi-Fi.
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Figure 3: Ubertooth spectral analysis, depicting Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Activity
The Ubertooth One proved to be a useful spectrum analysis tool. It detected both protocols in the 2.4GHz range
and displayed the traffic effectively. Although there were many transient devices at each intersection that were
using Bluetooth (representing in-car systems and mobile phones used by pedestrians), there were no identified
stationary Bluetooth devices at the traffic intersections (as the Bluetooth traffic did not have a static underlying
pattern) based on the variable BD_ADDR identifiers detected during analysis.
Similarly, the Wi-Fi signals found were identified as nearby houses or businesses from their SSIDs and signal
strength. There was no evidence to suggest that the 802.11 protocol was being used by the traffic lights to
communicate to either another intersection or the roadside control box.
However, of note was a consistently identified network traffic pulse at one specific intersection. Upon further
inspection of the surrounding traffic management infrastructure, a large antenna attached to the traffic light was
identified as the source of the pulse. Spectral analysis was conducted on the pulse, but similar to other
intersections, the pulse could not be classified as one of the investigated protocols, (ZigBee, Bluetooth or Wi-Fi),
and thus was not captured or classified. The pulse occurred regularly at one-minute intervals, and was
identifiable on two separate visits to the intersection, at similar times of day/days of week and peak traffic
conditions. A third visit to the intersection resulted in no pulse being identified. While circumstantial, it should
be noted that traffic conditions were much lighter during the third visit, which was conducted at a different time
of day/day of week, compared to the previous two visits.

CONCLUSION
This research set out to look for the security flaws highlighted by Cerrudo (2014), in a traffic system that used
in-road sensors connected via a wireless signal, namely ZigBee. As was outlined previously, there is some
evidence that these systems are in use in Melbourne, but no such evidence was found in regard to the
intersections investigated in Perth. The fact that there was no information on whether these systems were in
service in Perth needed to be examined. The tools necessary for this examination were procured and testing was
undertaken, however it became apparent that this protocol was not in use at the intersections tested. This result is
a good outcome from a security viewpoint, considering traffic lights in Perth; if ZigBee is not being used it
means it cannot be attacked via the methods outlined in Cerrudo (2014). This meant that the research project
needed to be re-evaluated and modified to test a wider array of wireless protocols. Bluetooth and Wi-Fi were
tested at the same intersections, using appropriate spectral analysis hardware and software. Similarly, there was
no evidence of either Bluetooth or Wi-Fi being used by the traffic lights.
Finally, the discovery of a large, consistent network pulse warranted further investigation to one specific
intersection. Further examination using the spectral analyser showed that none of the common wireless protocols
(ZigBee, Bluetooth or Wi-Fi) were in use, similar to in other intersections investigated. Whilst purely
circumstantial, the change in traffic conditions and related change in signal emission does add some weight to
the argument that the identified pulse signal is being used by the traffic lights to transmit information during
peak traffic periods. This is clearly an avenue for further research.
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